



# REGIONAL FOCUS

## ON THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) MEMBER STATES

**2024** GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES

JOINT ANALYSIS FOR BETTER DECISIONS

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The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on all the maps in this document do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

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## Key to icons

	Acutely food-insecure people		Agriculture
	Conflict/insecurity		Livestock
	Weather extremes/drought		Nutrition
	Weather extremes/flooding		Wasting
	Economic shocks		Pregnant and breastfeeding women
	Displacement – Internally displaced people (IDPs)		Health and nutrition services
	Displacement – Refugees		Food insecurity/lack of access to healthy diets
	Displacement – Returnees		Maternal and child-feeding practices

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Food and Agriculture  
Organization of the  
United Nations





# Foreword

## **Hunger levels in our region have reached an all-time high.**

This year, 62.9 million people in the IGAD region are facing severe food insecurity, with over 800 000 people – mainly in Sudan – experiencing catastrophic levels of acute hunger. These figures emphasize that we are not making sufficient progress in our commitment to end hunger, achieve food security, and improve nutrition by 2030 (SDG 2).

The rapid deterioration of the situation in the Sudan highlights the strong link between conflict and food insecurity, which is also evident in localized areas of Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan. Indeed, the ongoing conflict in various parts of our region has caused immense suffering upon millions, with famine confirmed in parts of North Darfur, in the Sudan.

Our region's vulnerability to climate extremes cannot be overlooked. Although improved rains since early 2023 have been aiding recovery from the historic 2020–2023 drought in the eastern parts, they have also led to severe flooding.

This report provides a crucial opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the food crisis landscape in our region and address the problem at its core. While eradicating hunger is achievable, it requires a fundamental shift in our approaches.

In the case of Sudan, it is imperative that we double our efforts to secure a cessation of hostilities, address the dire humanitarian crisis, and establish lasting peace, recognising the conflict's consequences for the broader region.

There is also an urgent need for proactive collaboration to implement sustainable solutions and strengthen our resilience against the impacts of climate change. Transforming our food systems to make them more resilient and sustainable should be a top priority in our policies. Lastly, simply responding in the aftermath of a crisis is not enough – we need to quickly scale up anticipatory action.

## **As we approach 2030, the urgency is real.**

Let us work together to ensure that the people of the IGAD region have access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food at all times. Our collective effort is our most vital asset in addressing the challenges we face, and in building a resilient region for generations to come.

**Workneh Gebeyehu (Ph.D)**

*Executive Secretary, IGAD*



# Acronyms

<b>ACAPS</b>	Assessment Capacities Project	<b>IFE</b>	Infant Feeding in Emergencies
<b>ACLED</b>	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project de la Région du Liptako Gourma)	<b>IFPRI</b>	International Food Policy Research Institute
<b>AFI</b>	Acute food insecurity	<b>IGAD</b>	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (in Eastern Africa)
<b>AMN</b>	Acute malnutrition	<b>IOD</b>	Indian Ocean Dipole
<b>ARI</b>	Acute respiratory infection	<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>ASAL</b>	Arid and semi-arid lands	<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>CARI</b>	Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security	<b>IPC</b>	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
<b>CDC</b>	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	<b>IPC FRC</b>	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Famine Review Committee
<b>CFASM</b>	Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission	<b>IYCF</b>	Infant and Young Child Feeding
<b>COVID-19</b>	Coronavirus disease 2019	<b>JJAS</b>	June to September
<b>DJF</b>	December to February	<b>MAM</b>	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
<b>DTM</b>	Displacement Tracking Matrix	<b>MJO</b>	Madden Julian Oscillation
<b>EC-JRC</b>	European Commission – Joint Research Centre	<b>MSNA</b>	Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment
<b>EC-JRC ASAP</b>	European Commission – Joint Research Centre Anomaly Hotspots of Agricultural Production	<b>MUAC</b>	Mid-Upper Arm Circumference
<b>ENSO</b>	El Niño-Southern Oscillation	<b>NOAA CPC</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Climate Prediction Center
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization	<b>NVA</b>	Nutrition Vulnerability Analysis
<b>FAO-DIEM</b>	FAO Data in Emergencies Hub	<b>OCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>FAO-GIEWS</b>	FAO Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture	<b>OND</b>	October to December
<b>FCS</b>	Food Consumption Score	<b>OPHI</b>	Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative
<b>FEWS NET</b>	Famine Early Warning Systems Network	<b>OWD</b>	Our World in Data
<b>FSC</b>	Food Security Cluster	<b>PBW</b>	Pregnant and breastfeeding women
<b>FSIN</b>	Food Security Information Network	<b>PDM</b>	Post-Distribution Monitoring
<b>FSNA</b>	Food Security and Nutrition Assessment	<b>PLW</b>	Pregnant and Lactating Women
<b>FSNAU</b>	Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Unit	<b>RSF</b>	Rapid Support Forces (in Sudan)
<b>FSNMS</b>	Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System	<b>SAF</b>	Sudanese Armed Forces
<b>FSNWG</b>	Food Security and Nutrition Working Group	<b>SAM</b>	Severe Acute Malnutrition
<b>GAM</b>	Global Acute Malnutrition	<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goal
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product	<b>SENS</b>	Standardised Expanded Nutrition Survey
<b>GEOGLAM</b>	Group on Earth Observations Global Agricultural Monitoring	<b>SMART</b>	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions
<b>GHI</b>	Global Hunger Index	<b>TWG</b>	Technical Working Group
<b>GNAFC</b>	Global Network Against Food Crises	<b>UDHS</b>	Uganda Demographic and Health Survey
<b>GNC</b>	Global Nutrition Cluster	<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>GRFC</b>	Global Report on Food Crises	<b>UNCTAD</b>	United Nations Trade and Development
<b>GRID</b>	Global Report on Internal Displacement	<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>HDI</b>	Humanitarian Development Index	<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>HNO</b>	Humanitarian Needs Overview	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>HRP</b>	Humanitarian Response Plan	<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>ICPAC</b>	IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre	<b>USD</b>	United States dollar
<b>ICPALD</b>	IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development	<b>USGS</b>	United States Geological Survey
<b>IDMC</b>	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre	<b>WASH</b>	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
<b>IDP</b>	Internally displaced people	<b>WB</b>	World Bank
<b>IFAD</b>	International Fund for Agricultural Development	<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
		<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

# In brief

Djibouti | Ethiopia | Kenya | Somalia |  
South Sudan | Sudan | Uganda

## Regional acute food insecurity worsened for the fifth year running in 2024

 **62.9M** people, or **25%** of the analysed population, face high levels of acute food insecurity in **seven** IGAD member states, in 2024

Acute food insecurity in the IGAD region has been steadily worsening over recent years, with 2024 seeing a further increase in the number of people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. Regionally, it rose from 61.9 million or 24 percent of the analysed population in 2023, to 62.9 million or 25 percent of the analysed population in 2024.

## Famine in the Sudan



In June 2024, the IPC assessed a risk of Famine in 14 areas (five localities and nine clusters of IDPs and refugees in Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, Al Jazirah states and some hotspots in Khartoum). In July 2024, the IPC Famine Review Committee concluded that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is ongoing in Zamzam Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in North Darfur due to heightened hostilities and lack of humanitarian access. The Famine is projected to last until the end of October. While uncertainty remains, the likelihood of Famine beyond October remains high in Zamzam camp and in many other areas throughout the Sudan, as long as the conflict and limited humanitarian access persist.

These increasing numbers are driven by the escalation in conflict and concomitant humanitarian disaster in the Sudan, outpacing notable improvements in Kenya and Somalia.

Ethiopia and Uganda have more people with high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024 than 2023, while South Sudan has slightly fewer due to favourable 2023/24 harvests. However, the number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in South Sudan was projected to double.

The Sudan has the region's largest number of people facing high levels of food insecurity at 25.6 million, followed by Ethiopia<sup>1</sup> at 21–22 million and South Sudan at 7.1 million. South Sudan and the Sudan have the highest prevalence with well over half their total populations in need of urgent food and livelihood assistance.



## More than 0.8 million people face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in 2024

In 2024, the number of people projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) increased in the Sudan and South Sudan since the same periods in 2023. In the Sudan, 755 300 people are projected to be in this phase during the June–September lean season (compared with zero in 2023). In South Sudan, 79 000 people were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in April–July 2024 compared with 43 000 during the same period in 2023. On a positive note, Somalia has no population projected in this phase, down from 40 000 people across Bakool, Bay, Galgaduud, Middle Shabelle, Mudug and Togdheer states in 2023.

## Repeated shocks on top of structural vulnerabilities erode household resilience



**Conflict/insecurity** Conflict in the Sudan has devastated livelihoods, disrupted basic services, and triggered the world's largest internal displacement crisis. Inter-communal violence, resource-based conflicts and/

<sup>1</sup> The Government of Ethiopia did not endorse the May 2021 IPC analysis.

or cattle raiding are also affecting parts of Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya.



## Economic shocks

Adverse macroeconomic conditions, characterized by local currency

depreciation, low foreign currency reserves, a high public debt burden and volatile food prices have continued to restrict food access across nearly all countries in the region. In the Sudan, by May 2024, national average prices of key staples were more than double the levels of May 2023 (WFP Dataviz, 2024) as localized conflict severely impacted food production and supply systems. In South Sudan, food inflation reached 186 percent in March 2024 (Trading Economics, August 2024).



## Weather extremes

Abundant October–December 2023 and March–May

2024 rains aided recovery from the devastating multi-season 2020–2023 drought in parts of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. However, it also led to severe localized flooding, resulting in the loss of lives and livestock, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, and the destruction of farmlands and critical infrastructure.

## Acute malnutrition generally worsened across the region since 2023



**11.4M** acutely malnourished children under 5 years in seven countries with **2.8M** of them suffering the most severe form of wasting.

Acute malnutrition among children and women remains extremely concerning across the region, as persistent underlying drivers—namely lack of food, inadequate services, and poor infant and young child feeding practices—have been exacerbated by escalating conflicts, economic shocks, and the effects of weather extremes, including the 2020–2023 drought. High numbers of acutely malnourished children are found in

Ethiopia (4.1 million) and the Sudan (3.7 million), followed by Somalia, South Sudan and Kenya.

## The number of forcibly displaced people was the highest on record by mid-2024



**25M** forcibly displaced people by mid-2024, consisting of **20M** IDPs in six countries and **5M** refugees and asylum seekers.

The region continues to have more forcibly displaced people than any other region in the *Global Report on Food Crises*. The conflict in the Sudan has driven an alarming increase in the regional number since the end of 2023 – up from 20.5 million to 25 million by mid-2024.

High levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition are particularly prevalent among displaced populations. This is linked to limited access to employment, land and livelihoods, unreliable access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and health services, and reliance on dwindling humanitarian assistance to meet basic needs.

More than half the region's 20 million internally displaced people are in the Sudan, followed by Somalia and Ethiopia. Since the start of the conflict in the Sudan in April 2023, 7.9 million people have been internally displaced making it the world's largest internal displacement crisis.

Displaced people have put additional strain on already meagre resources in areas within the country and at its borders. About 2.3 million people have fled to neighbouring countries, a third of them to South Sudan.

The conflict in the Sudan is prompting hundreds of thousands of refugees to return to South Sudan, where they face a critical food and nutrition crisis. Some 28 000 of them were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between April and July 2024 (IPC, November 2023).



# Chapter 1 | Introduction



# Introduction

## About the report

This regional report is the result of a collaboration between the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional economic community that forms one of the building blocks of the African Union. IGAD seeks to assist and complement the efforts of its eight member states – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda – to achieve food security and environmental protection, peace and security, and economic cooperation and integration through increased cooperation.

This report provides a comprehensive assessment of acute food insecurity and malnutrition in IGAD

### The purpose of the report is to:

- Provide an analysis of the food crises among IGAD member states for humanitarian and development stakeholders and policymakers;
- Present underlying and immediate drivers of acute food insecurity and malnutrition and analyse the evolution of food crises for countries included in past editions;
- Contribute to maintaining food security and nutrition as priority sectors for policymakers and donors;
- Advocate for timely responses to food crises;
- Offer insights into immediate and medium-term risks to food security and nutrition status of populations.

countries as well as trends over time, key drivers and populations of highest concern based on a rigorous methodology. It also presents available data and information on forcibly displaced populations. The report serves as a key reference for governments, policy makers, and development and humanitarian actors in their efforts to tackle the root causes of food crises in the region.

### The Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC)

This report is a by-product of the annual *GRFC*, which is produced by the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) in support of the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC). The *GRFC* is based on partnership, collaboration and consensus among 16 partners consisting of regional intergovernmental bodies, donors, technical bodies, clusters and United Nations agencies. The result is an independent reference document presenting a consensus-driven analysis validated and endorsed by global and regional experts in food security, nutrition and forced displacement.

## Methodology at a glance

### Data sources

#### Acute food insecurity data

The main data source for acute food insecurity is the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC). This is a multistakeholder, consensus-based process that results in a classification of the magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity based on a convergence of evidence.

For two countries (Ethiopia and Uganda) where these analyses are not available, acute food insecurity estimates are derived from IPC-

FIG. 1.1 IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

Phase	Phase description and priority response objectives
<b>Phase 1</b> None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income. Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction.
<b>Phase 2</b> Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies. Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods.
<b>Phase 3</b> Crisis	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or</li> <li>• are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.</li> </ul> <b>URGENT ACTION</b> required to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
<b>Phase 4</b> Emergency	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or</li> <li>• are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.</li> </ul> <b>URGENT ACTION</b> required to save lives and livelihoods.
<b>Phase 5</b> Catastrophe/ Famine	<b>Households</b> have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and Extremely Critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. For a <b>Famine</b> classification, an <b>area</b> needs to have 20% of households facing an extreme lack of food, and Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.* <b>URGENT ACTION</b> required to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

\* An area is classified in **Famine with solid evidence** if there is clear and compelling evidence that the Famine thresholds for starvation, acute malnutrition and mortality have been reached. An area is classified in **Famine with reasonable evidence** if there is clear evidence that two of the three thresholds for starvation, acute malnutrition and mortality have been reached, and analysts reasonably assess from the broader evidence that the threshold from the third outcome has likely been reached (IPC, March 2024).

compatible Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) analyses.

For projection data, IPC and FEWS NET methodologies 'project' the acute food insecurity situation based on the most likely scenario by developing assumptions on the evolution of food security drivers and their impacts on food security

outcomes. All data presented in this report are the latest available as of August 2024.

### Malnutrition data

Acute malnutrition burden estimates are collected from IPC acute malnutrition analyses, HNOs and estimates by UNICEF and WFP. Acute malnutrition prevalence data are collected from



Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) surveys, Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), or national nutrition surveys.

### Displacement data

Statistics on refugees and asylum seekers primarily come from the UNHCR through nowcasting figures for May 2024, and on internally displaced persons through the IOM, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and governments' data, based on figures available as of mid-2024.

### Peak acute food insecurity estimates

This Regional Focus on Food Crises reports the highest (or peak) estimates of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) in 2023 and 2024. As acute food insecurity can be seasonal or the consequence of a shock, the peak figure may not reflect the situation throughout the year in that country and can be based on a projection.

### Eritrea is a data gap

Eritrea has qualified for inclusion in all GRFC editions as it is monitored by FAO-GIEWS, but data on acute food insecurity have not been available for any of these years.

Satellite data indicate that Eritrea had similar drought conditions to those that affected the Horn of Africa between 2020 and 2023. These conditions likely had a negative impact on the food security of the population who depend on pastoralism and rain-fed agriculture, suggesting a prolonged recovery period (WFP, July 2023). In 2023, crops benefited from an overall favourable performance of the Kiremti rainy season (FAO, November 2023). The IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre's (ICPAC) June to September 2024 seasonal forecast indicates an increased likelihood of above-normal rainfall in the country (ICPAC, May 2024).

## Trend analysis on financing flows to food sectors

**The current trends in external financing to food crises in East Africa fail to pave the way for sustainable improvements in food security, according to the 2023 Financing Flows and Food Crises report (GNAFC, 2023).**

Information from the OCHA Financial Tracking System (FTS) shows that while needs remained high, the record 2022 levels of humanitarian aid contributions were not sustained in 2023. Based on the HRP funding requirements, this resulted in an increasing gap between needs and funding (OCHA, 2023).

### IGAD region largest recipient of humanitarian food assistance

In 2022, out of the seven regions covered by the GRFC, the IGAD region had the most people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, at 55.4 million across seven countries. By comparison with other regions, it received the largest amount of humanitarian assistance to food sectors at USD 4.4 billion, equalling 29 percent of total humanitarian allocations to food sectors that year. This was an increase of USD 1.5 billion from 2016, in line with an observed deterioration in acute food insecurity and in response to the devastating drought in the Horn of Africa. The record 2022 humanitarian disbursements to food sectors were a significant increase compared with previous years of stagnant allocations, with an average of USD 3 billion from 2016 to 2021.

### Decreasing funding in 2023

Data suggest that the 2022 funding records to food sectors were not sustained in 2023. This is likely the first year since 2010 that humanitarian funding has declined year-on-year, but was still the second highest funding level for humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2023).

### Development assistance to food sectors stagnant in IGAD region

In terms of development assistance, preliminary data indicate that in 2022 the IGAD region received among the highest amounts to food sectors, totaling USD 1.8 billion and accounting for 26 percent of global development allocations. Although this was an increase of USD 278 million from 2021, it remained on a par with the 2016–2022 average development allocations to food sectors.


Over the years from 2016 to 2022, agriculture was the most-funded sector in development assistance. Conversely, agriculture in emergency contexts has been the least funded sector in humanitarian assistance and has since 2016 accounted for an average of just 6 percent of total humanitarian allocations to food sectors – despite the significant role of agriculture in the IGAD region. Over 70 percent of the IGAD population is employed in agriculture, and more than 60 percent of export earnings come from primary agricultural commodities (IGAD, 2023).

Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan are facing protracted major food crises in the region. Since 2016, these countries have accounted for the majority of the region's population in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) and received on average around 90 percent of the humanitarian assistance to food sectors in the region from 2016–2022.

Development allocations to food sectors in these same countries represented only a limited portion of humanitarian allocations. On average, since 2016 the total amount of development assistance allocated to protracted crises in the region has been less than half (41 percent) of the total humanitarian allocations.

Layering and sequencing between humanitarian and development financing is needed to address the root causes of acute food insecurity and reduce humanitarian needs particularly in countries with protracted crises and recurrent famine-risk contexts. Greater coherence is essential to build stability and prevent acute food insecurity outcomes in the future.

**FIG. 2.2 Humanitarian and development assistance to highly acutely food-insecure populations in the IGAD region, 2016–2022 (USD billions)**



Source: GNAFC.



# Spotlight on the Sudan

**Heavy fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since April 2023 has had devastating consequences across the Sudan and in the neighbouring countries of the Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan.**

Over a year into the conflict, the Sudan faces one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent history. Millions of people among the displaced and host communities, especially women and children, are experiencing severe access constraints to basic commodities and services, including food, water and shelter, with severe impacts on their food security and nutrition.



## Acute food insecurity in the Sudan has reached the highest in IPC history

The July 2024 IPC analysis estimated that 25.6 million people, or 54 percent of the total population, face high levels of acute food insecurity during the June–September 2024 lean season. Of these, 8.5 million face Emergency (IPC Phase 4), while close to 0.8 million are in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, Blue Nile, Al Jazirah and Khartoum. This marks a significant and alarming deterioration compared with the pre-conflict June–September 2022 lean season when 11.65 million people, or 24 percent of the total population, faced high levels of acute food insecurity. It also marks a major deterioration since the July–September 2023 lean season when 20.3 million people, or 42 percent of the population, faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

If the conflict escalates further, preventing households from engaging in agricultural and

## Famine in Zamzam IDP camp



In July 2024, the IPC Famine Review Committee (FRC) found it plausible that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is ongoing in the Zamzam IDP camp near El Fasher town in North Darfur from August–October 2024 (FRC, July 2024).

As a result of the intensification of fighting, around 320 000 people are believed to have been displaced since mid-April in El Fasher. Around 150 000 to 200 000 of them are believed to have moved to Zamzam camp in search of security, basic services, and food since mid-May. The camp population expanded to over half a million in a few weeks (FRC, July 2024).

Areas are classified in Famine (IPC Phase 5) when at least 20 percent of households have an extreme lack of food and face starvation and destitution, resulting in extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition and death. The classification signifies multi-sectoral collapse, with basic human needs for health services, water, food, nutrition, shelter and protection not being met.

casual labour activities during the 2024 agricultural season, and limiting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the situation can only be expected to worsen. There is a risk of Famine in 14 areas (five localities and nine clusters of IDPs and refugees, in Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, Al Jazirah states and some hotspots in Khartoum), if the conflict escalates further, including through increased mobilization of local militias (IPC, July 2024).

Most displaced individuals have lost their livelihoods, impacting their ability to produce and access food. Furthermore, displacement within localities has intensified competition and pressure on available food resources and services, while socioeconomic structures continue weakening. Between June and September, at least 533 000 IDPs and refugees in conflict-affected localities and states for which data were available (representing around 20 percent of the displaced population in the Sudan) are projected to experience Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (IPC, July 2024).



## Major impact on the country's agriculture sector

National food availability for the 2023–2024 consumption year is significantly below needs. The conflict has severely restricted access to land for cultivation and seasonal activities, making it extremely difficult for households to produce food. Critical infrastructure for food production and storage has been destroyed, including in southeastern areas – the country's breadbasket.

Wheat production was estimated to be significantly below average due to disrupted planting, particularly in the Gezira Scheme, which typically accounts for around 40 percent of the wheat area in the country. It was forecasted at 377 900 tonnes, 21 percent lower than the previous year and 46 percent below the five-year average.

Limited availability and high cost of agricultural inputs, including seeds, and limited access to agricultural finance exacerbated the situation, as supply chains remained interrupted. The 2023 Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission

(CFSAM) estimated national cereal production (sorghum, millet and wheat) at about 4.1 million tonnes, 46 percent below 2022's output and about 40 percent below the average of the previous five years. In Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur regions, where the conflict has been especially intense, cereal production was estimated to be up to 80 percent below average, with an almost total crop failure in West Darfur state, where farmers could not access their fields (FAO-GIEWS, June 2024).

Combined with rapid currency depreciation, this has put upward pressure on staple food prices. For instance, the average retail price of wheat flour in May 2024 was 247 percent higher than the previous five-year average (IPC, July 2024). Livestock movement in search of water and pasture also continues to be disrupted.

The 2024 June–September (JJAS) rains are forecast to be largely above average due to an anticipated transition to La Niña. While this presents positive prospects for cereal and livestock production, concerns remain for cereal output due to the spread of conflict to southeastern key-producing areas in late 2023, and persistent shortages and high costs of agricultural inputs (FAO-GIEWS, June 2024).

FEWS NET assesses that the seasonal flood extent this year will be above normal and likely similar to recent years of severe flooding in the Sudan (FEWS NET, May 2024). Extensive flooding would bring further crop and livestock losses, damage infrastructure, and displace populations. As of 28 July 2024, heavy rainfall and flash floods had affected thousands of people in parts of Kassala state (OCHA, July 2024).

## Spotlight on the Sudan (continued)

### Alarming levels of acute malnutrition threaten lives of children and women

Since the start of the conflict, an already concerning acute malnutrition situation has significantly deteriorated due to massive displacement, resulting in poor sanitation and hygiene, increased risk of infections, and limited access and availability to basic health and nutrition services. WHO assesses that about 70 percent of health facilities and more than two-thirds of the main hospitals in the conflict-affected areas are either non-functional or destroyed. Those that are still functioning are in danger of closing due to shortages of medical staff, supplies and electricity.

In Zamzam camp, North Darfur, GAM prevalence among children under 5 years is estimated at 29.4 percent based on a MUAC screening conducted between March and April 2024, while in Zalingei locality, Central Darfur, it's 15.6 percent, according to a SMART survey done in March 2024. These are well above the WHO Very High threshold.

In other more accessible localities in Blue Nile, Gedaref and Kassala, GAM prevalence ranges from 9.6 to 16.9 percent, according to SMART surveys conducted between December 2023 and June 2024. In areas that are not accessible due to the fighting – where children are in most urgent need – the situation is likely even worse. Malnutrition among pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW) is also alarming, with screenings in Zamzam camp showing that over 33 percent are acutely malnourished.

Over the coming months, the nutrition situation in the Sudan will be influenced by several factors, including the ongoing rainfall season (which could induce floods leading to increased risk of water-borne diseases, and consequently more cases of acute malnutrition in localized areas) and the

FIG. 2.6 Numbers of IDPs in Sudan, mid-2023–mid-2024



Source: IOM, August 2024.

expansion of conflict. These factors will determine the extent of access for humanitarian assistance, with states receiving limited or no humanitarian assistance particularly affected, as their ability to deal with the increasing burden of disease and food insecurity, compounded by rising demand from the high number of IDPs, is constrained.

### The world's largest internal displacement crisis

As of July 2024, about 7.9 million people had been internally displaced as a result of hostilities since April 2023 (IOM, July 2024).

Added to those displaced before the start of the conflict, this brings the total number of IDPs to about 10.7 million – making the Sudan the largest internal displacement crisis in the world.

Before the conflict, internal displacement was primarily concentrated in Darfur and Kordofan states. Now IDPs are reportedly displaced from 17 states of origin to all 18 states. Khartoum represents the top state of origin, accounting for 36 percent of all IDPs in the country.

About 2.3 million people have also crossed borders into neighbouring countries since April 2023, bringing the total number of those displaced due to the conflict to 10.2 million (UNHCR, August 2024). With no end to the conflict in sight, amid

limited resources and humanitarian access for actors to respond to the crisis, displacement in and out of the Sudan is projected to continue (UNHCR, April 2024), as is a deterioration in the food security and nutrition situation of those displaced.

### A crisis beyond the country's borders

The cross-border impacts of the conflict continue as the Sudan's neighbours record surging refugee arrivals, the majority in Chad (36 percent), South Sudan (33 percent) and Egypt (23 percent) (IOM, July 2024). Even before the conflict, these countries were already grappling with other crises of their own, including high levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition, large numbers of displaced populations, conflict, political upheavals, and economic crises.

In South Sudan and Chad, critical services and resources in areas receiving and hosting refugees are overwhelmed, and humanitarian responses are at breaking point, resulting in increasingly appalling living conditions. In South Sudan, returnees and refugee arrivals at transit centres face critical needs for food, health and nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene services, shelter, and protection (FSNWG, April 2024). This at a time when 56 percent of South Sudan's population

is already experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity. Around 28 000 or 10 percent of the returnee population in South Sudan were projected to face Catastrophe levels of acute food insecurity in April–July 2024 (IPC, November 2023).

Regarding acute malnutrition, Sudanese refugee and returnee populations who have sought refuge in Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan had MUAC measurements indicating levels of wasting above the 15 percent Very High WHO threshold for all countries, except Ethiopia.

The situation was the most severe in border points in South Sudan, with screenings between May and November 2023 indicating that nearly 30 percent of children under 5 years old and a staggering 58 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW) were acutely malnourished (UNHCR, 2024).

This situation was also extremely concerning in Chad, where MUAC screenings at border points indicated 29 percent of children aged under 5, and 11 percent of PBW were acutely malnourished. Large proportions of the newly arrived refugee and returnee populations in Eastern Chad are acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance, reaching 44 percent of the newly arrived refugees in Ouaddai in June–August 2024 (CH, April 2024).

At border crossing points of the Central African Republic, 17 percent of children under 5 years were acutely malnourished. In Ethiopia, the acute malnutrition situation was relatively better but still above the High WHO threshold, at 12 percent for children and 13 percent for PBW (UNHCR, 2024).



# Chapter 2 | Overview



# Overview of food crises in the IGAD region, 2024

Increased conflicts and insecurity, particularly the humanitarian emergency in the Sudan, the continued effects of the severe 2020–2023 drought, and widespread macroeconomic instability are driving an extremely concerning food insecurity and malnutrition situation in 2024. While El Niño-induced enhanced rainfall has improved food security in many areas, especially in Kenya, floods have caused significant displacement and affected cropping seasons in many places.

**62.9M** 

people or 25% of the analysed population face high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024 in seven countries.

**11.4M** 


children under 5 years are acutely malnourished with 2.8 million of them suffering the most severe form.

**25.0M** 

forcibly displaced people by mid-2024 – consisting of 20.0 million IDPs and 5.0 million refugees and asylum seekers.

Djibouti | Ethiopia | Kenya | Somalia | South Sudan | Sudan | Uganda

MAP 2.1 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2024



The Ethiopia figure has not been endorsed by the Government of Ethiopia.  
Source: IPC TWGs; FEWS NET (Ethiopia and Uganda)

## How has the situation changed since 2023?

The increase in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity from 61.9 million in 2023 to 62.9 million in 2024 is driven by the alarming deterioration in the Sudan outpacing the notable improvements in Kenya and Somalia. In addition, Ethiopia and Uganda have more people experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024 than 2023 while Somalia and South Sudan have fewer.

In the **Sudan**, over a year of conflict-driven humanitarian disaster has led to the worst levels of acute food insecurity ever recorded by the IPC in the country. The Famine Review Committee (FRC) finds it plausible that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is ongoing from July 2024 and will continue to at least October in Zamzam camp near El Fasher town in North Darfur. This signifies a multi-sectoral collapse with basic human needs for health services, water, food, nutrition, shelter, and protection not being met. While uncertainty remains, the FRC finds a high likelihood of Famine in Zamzam camp beyond October and that 13 other areas throughout the Sudan remain at risk of Famine as long as the conflict and limited humanitarian access continue (FRC, July 2024).

From June–September 2024, 755 300 people in the Sudan face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity has increased from 20.3 million during the 2023 lean season to 25.6 million during the 2024 lean season, representing some 5.3 million additional people. If the conflict escalates,



increased militia mobilization will further restrict humanitarian access and hinder farming and casual labour activities during the 2024 cropping season (IPC, June 2024).


The conflict has caused mass displacement, disrupted supply routes and agricultural production, and limited access to humanitarian aid, worsening the already dire crisis. The situation is particularly critical in areas directly affected by the conflict in Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, Khartoum, and Al Jazirah states. With 10.7 million IDPs, the Sudan faces the world's worst internal displacement crisis, which has increased competition for resources and weakened socioeconomic structures, intensifying the pressure on available food sources and services (IPC, June 2024).

The food security situation worsened in **Ethiopia** as households in northeastern Amhara and Tigray grappled with little to no food stocks following the El Niño-induced drought that led to the failure of the 2023 Meher harvest and heavy rainfall led to localized flooding, predominantly in areas of the Somali, Afar and Oromia regions resulting in displacement and livestock deaths (FEWS NET, May 2024). Conflict was also a significant factor in parts of Amhara and Oromia.

Deteriorations were also recorded in **Uganda** due to the impacts of a multi-season drought, including an early start to the lean season, and low household coping capacity in Karamoja (FEWS NET, April 2024).

Although **South Sudan** recorded a slight reduction in populations in IPC Phase 3 or above since the 2023 peak due to above-average rains in most parts of the country and favourable 2023/24 harvests, acute food insecurity is expected to become more severe with a projected rise in the number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), a third of whom are returnees from the Sudan (IPC, June 2024).

MAP 2.2 Share of analysed populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2024



Source: IPC TWGs; FEWS NET (Ethiopia and Uganda).

In 2024, there are some notable improvements such as in **Kenya** with a 64 percent reduction in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity due to favourable rains, a positive harvest, and improved livestock production (IPC, March 2024). Similarly, **Somalia** experienced improvements due to increased rainfall over the

past three seasons and sustained humanitarian assistance (IPC, February 2024). No populations were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) but the lingering impacts of the 2020–2023 drought, high food prices, conflict and riverine flooding in April and May 2024 increased levels of acute food insecurity in localized areas (FSNWG, April 2024).

While the overall situation in **Djibouti** remains similar to 2023 levels, the severity of acute food insecurity has decreased with the numbers of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) nearly halved. However, the situation is expected to be especially concerning for the rural populations in Ali Sabieh, Obock, Tadjourah and Arta regions, as well as in the country's refugee camps (IPC, June 2024).

### Severity of acute food insecurity

IPC data disaggregated by phase are used for Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan. For Ethiopia and Uganda, the source is FEWS NET with no phase disaggregation data.

**834 300 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the Sudan and South Sudan**

In 2024, two countries had populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). In the Sudan, the number of people in this phase increased from zero in 2023 to 755 300. In South Sudan it has nearly doubled from the previous year, from 43 000 to 79 000, including 28 000 returnees from the Sudan.

No one is projected in this phase in Somalia, an improvement from over 40 300 in 2023.

**12 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across five countries**

In 2024, a total of 12 million people are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4), slightly fewer than the 12.3 million in the peak period of 2023, with however a lot of variability from country to country. The Sudan had the largest number with 8.5 million people in this phase, an increase of 36 percent from the 6.3 million in 2023. In the other four countries, the population in IPC Phase 4 decreased, most significantly in Kenya with a 76 percent decrease, Somalia with a 57 percent decrease and Djibouti with a 47 percent decrease.



### 26.1 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) across five countries

The number of people in IPC Phase 3 – also in urgent need of food assistance – in 2024 decreased from 27.9 million in 2023, primarily led by the improvement in Kenya and Somalia. In the Sudan, the number of people in this phase increased by more than 2 million – from 14 million in 2023 to 16.3 million in 2024.



### 30.8 million people in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) across five countries

Almost 31 million people are in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) in 2024. Of most concern is the Sudan where 17 million people in this phase are at risk of transitioning into more severe phases of acute food insecurity.

## Acute food insecurity since 2016


**Levels of high acute food insecurity in the IGAD region remained relatively stable through 2019, but, with the convergence of multiple shocks, the magnitude and severity of the region's food crises have since increased rapidly.**

After a stable number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity between 2016 and 2019, the population in IPC Phase 3 or above in the IGAD region rapidly increased from 2020, with more than 10 million additional people each year up to 2022, and over 6 million more between 2022 and 2023. In 2024, an additional 1 million people are expected to be in IPC Phase 3 or above compared with 2023.

This is attributed to multiple shocks including the severe 2020–2023 drought in parts of **Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia**, atypical flooding, and heightened conflict, such as in northern Ethiopia and the Sudan.

In addition are the long-running socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, and macro-economic challenges, including debt distress, high inflation rates, and local currency depreciation, which have had negative repercussions on

**FIG. 2.1 Numbers of people and share of analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024**



Seven countries were analysed in all years except 2019, when only six were covered.

Source: IPC TWGs; FEWS NET (Ethiopia and Uganda).

1+2 - None/Minimal + Stressed 3+ - Crisis or worse Share of analysed population in 3+ - Crisis or worse Total population

food access. These have been exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, especially given the high dependence of IGAD's net-importing members states on Ukraine and the Russian Federation for agricultural inputs, wheat, sunflower oil and crude oil (WFP, November 2022). The end of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023 additionally made it increasingly difficult and expensive to import and produce staple foods (IFPRI, August 2023). All these factors have undermined households' already limited capacity to cope with shocks.

Acute food insecurity in the IGAD region has historically been extremely severe, with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) since 2016 in **South Sudan**. In recent years, people have faced IPC Phase 5 in **Somalia, Ethiopia** (Tigray region),<sup>1</sup> and more recently in the **Sudan**, where close to 755 300 people are projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) through September 2024, and Zamzam IDP camp in Al Fasher, North Darfur is classified in Famine at least through end-October 2024 (FRC, July 2024).

<sup>1</sup> The Government of Ethiopia did not endorse the May 2021 IPC analysis.


Since 2010, there have been just two other examples of Famine (IPC Phase 5) classification in the world and they were both in the IGAD region. In 2011, in parts of Southern **Somalia** including Balcad and Cadale districts of Middle Shabelle, the Afgoye corridor IDP settlement, and the Mogadishu IDP community, this was driven by conflict, drought, and poor rains (FSNAU & FEWS NET, July 2011). In **South Sudan** in 2017, Famine in parts of Unity State occurred after three years of civil war that devastated livelihoods, coupled with an ailing economy and high food prices (IPC, January 2017).

When evaluating year-on-year regional trends, it must be taken into account that some countries, such as Djibouti, were not included every year, while others (Ethiopia and Uganda) saw major changes in the geographic coverage of analyses and data sources. Kenya, by contrast, saw increases in the analysed population in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs).

## Nutrition

**The situation remains dire across countries in the region as persistent underlying drivers of acute malnutrition – namely insufficient food consumption, inadequate services, and poor practices – have been exacerbated by escalating conflicts, cumulative effects of weather extremes, and economic shocks.**

**FIG. 2.2 Children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition in the IGAD region, 2024**



**3.9M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2024.**

Source: HNO 2024 (Ethiopia); IPC TWGs (Somalia, South Sudan, Kenya and Uganda); Sudan Nutrition Sector, 2024.


The magnitude and severity of acute malnutrition generally worsened across the region since 2023.

By mid-June 2024, at least 11.4 million children under 5 years old were acutely malnourished, with 2.8 million of them severely malnourished. Additionally, approximately 3.9 million pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW) were estimated to be acutely malnourished by mid-2024.

The **Sudan** and **Ethiopia** face the largest nutrition crises, with 3.7 million and 3.3 million acutely malnourished children respectively. **Somalia, South Sudan and Kenya** follow, while **Uganda** and **Djibouti** have comparatively lower numbers (see figure 2.3).



**FIG. 2.3 Children under 5 years old with acute malnutrition by country, by mid-2024**



Source: HNO 2024 (Ethiopia); IPC TWGs (Somalia, South Sudan, Kenya and Uganda); Sudan Nutrition Sector, 2024.

In the **Sudan**, the escalating conflict and massive population displacement have disrupted access to basic services, worsened food and water security and led to disease outbreaks. The number of acutely malnourished children and pregnant and breastfeeding women increased by 22 percent compared with pre-conflict estimates (Sudan Nutrition Cluster, 2024). In some areas, global acute malnutrition (GAM) levels had already crossed the Emergency thresholds, even before the lean season, which traditionally is a time of higher nutrition vulnerability. In areas with limited access, a Nutrition Vulnerability Analysis indicates the likelihood of Critical and Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition in seven out of ten states analysed (NVA, May 2024). The ongoing floods risk worsening the situation.

In **Ethiopia**, recent nutrition assessments in 2024 showed increased prevalence of severe wasting and higher levels of global acute malnutrition (GAM) across various regions, particularly those affected by drought in previous years. SMART surveys conducted in August 2023 in rural areas and IDP sites across Tigray region

indicated a Very High/Critical prevalence of acute malnutrition, with the highest prevalence among IDPs (26.5 percent). Some 61 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women were suffering from acute malnutrition (MUAC < 23cm), indicating an Extremely Critical situation (SMART, August 2023).


In **South Sudan**, floods in 2024 are likely to exacerbate dire sanitary conditions in a context of poor health service provision. In **Uganda**, notably in Karamoja, the malnutrition situation is expected to deteriorate due to reduced food availability. In **Djibouti**, high levels of acute food insecurity and a high incidence of diarrhoea, especially in the Obock region and among refugee populations, are expected to drive up acute malnutrition.

Conversely, **Kenya** and **Somalia** are experiencing a slight decline in the number of acutely malnourished under-5-year-old children in 2024, mostly reflecting improved food security conditions. However, severity of acute malnutrition remains high in these two countries, especially in Turkana South in Kenya.

## Displacement


**A total of 25 million people were living in forced displacement by mid-2024 in seven IGAD member states, the highest level on record.**

**FIG. 2.4 Number of forcibly displaced people in seven countries in the region, 2024**



Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, May 2024; GRID 2024, May 2024; IOM, April, June and July 2024.

**FIG. 2.5 Number of forcibly displaced people by country, mid-2024**



Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, May 2024; GRID 2024, May 2024. IOM, April and June 2024.

## The Sudan has the largest number of internally displaced people globally

Conflict and insecurity are forcing a high proportion of displacements, notably in the **Sudan**, which has become the largest internal displacement situation globally. Some 10.2 million people have been forcibly displaced since the outbreak of conflict in April 2023, consisting of 7.9 million IDPs and 2.3 million refugees/asylum seekers in neighbouring countries (IOM, July 2024; UNHCR, August 2024).

Drought in the Horn of Africa, and flooding in **Ethiopia**, **Kenya**, **Somalia** and **South Sudan**, have featured prominently in people's motivations to relocate in recent years.

Out of the 5 million refugees and asylum seekers in seven IGAD member states by mid-2024, most were in **Uganda**, **Ethiopia** and the **Sudan**. The largest number (about 2.2 million) were from **South Sudan**, while an increasing number were

from the **Sudan** (around 0.2 million). Around 1.2 million Sudanese refugees have sought refuge outside the IGAD region, in neighbouring Chad, the Central African Republic, Egypt and Libya (UNHCR, June 2024).

## Drought and conflict perpetuated extensive displacement in Ethiopia

**Ethiopia** has the second largest number of IDPs in the region, with 3.7 million across 24 sites and camps primarily due to conflict (65 percent of IDPs) followed by drought (18 percent) (GRID, June 2024). The Somali region hosted the highest number of IDPs who were displaced by drought, while the Tigray region hosted the highest number of those displaced by conflict (IOM, October 2023). Ethiopia's refugee population of around 1 million people is predominantly from South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea.

IDPs and refugees experienced large food consumption gaps and lacked access to services,



Sudan has become the world's largest internal displacement crisis and as of August 2024, more than 767 000 people have crossed the border into South Sudan, mainly via the Joda border point in Renk, from where they move to a nearby transit centre for a few days until they are relocated to either refugee camps or their final destination.

leading to disease outbreaks, as well as acute food insecurity and malnutrition levels that were similar to those of the host population (UNHCR, February 2024).

### Very concerning acute malnutrition levels among refugees and IDPs in the region

**Uganda** is Africa's largest host of refugees, with over 1.7 million refugees and asylum-seekers, primarily from South Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo, living across 13 settlements (UNHCR, July 2024). Inflation, sluggish recovery

from COVID-19 and reduced humanitarian funding result in high levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition.

Of 12 analysed refugee-hosting districts in Uganda, the food security situation was anticipated to deteriorate from 20 percent of the analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity from August 2023–January 2024 to 23 percent in February–June 2024 (IPC, November 2023). Around 39 400 refugee children under 5 years were estimated to suffer from acute malnutrition in the 13 rural-based refugee

camps from April 2023–March 2024, with 6 600 of them suffering the most severe life-threatening form (IPC, November 2023). The situation could deteriorate further in 2024 with diminished international funding (European Commission, October 2023).

In **Somalia**, from April to June 2024, most IDP settlements were projected to experience Crisis conditions (IPC Phase 3) due to limited purchasing power, likely flooding in IDP settlements and expected reduction in food assistance. However, IDPs in urban areas of Lasaanod (Sool),

Dhusamareeb (Galgadud) and in Bay and Bakool region will face Emergency (IPC Phase 4), mainly due to disruptions to livelihoods and market access, disease outbreaks, and reduced access to health services and humanitarian assistance (IPC, February 2024). About 0.4 million internally displaced children under 5 years are estimated to suffer acute malnutrition between January and December 2024 (IPC, February 2024). Out of the 11 IDP populations assessed, seven were classified in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) while the other four were in Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3) due to poor food consumption in terms of frequency and diversity, and high prevalence of diseases, with 27 percent of children reportedly sick in the two weeks before the assessment. In addition, vaccination and Vitamin A supplementation were inadequate and death rates were at Serious levels among Dhusamareeb and Mogadishu IDP populations (IPC, February 2024).

Nearly half of the SENS nutrition assessments conducted across refugee camps in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, the Sudan, before the start of the conflict, and Uganda found High (>10 percent) or Very High (>15 percent) levels of acute malnutrition among children under the age of 5 years (UNHCR, 2023).

The situation was most concerning in **Ethiopia** where the levels were High or Very High in 14 out of 21 camps, in **South Sudan** (High or Very High in four out of eight camps), and in **Djibouti** (all three camps). High levels of anaemia among children under 5 years old and women of reproductive age were also widespread in refugee camps. Refugees in all assessed camps had inadequate food consumption (according to the Food Consumption Score (FCS) indicator). In some camps in **Ethiopia** and **Kenya**, more than 70 percent of refugees had a poor FCS (UNHCR, 2021–2023).

See **Spotlight on the Sudan**, p 3–4, for information about acute food insecurity and malnutrition among displaced populations in the country.



## Focus on pastoralism

**High numbers of people are engaged in pastoralism throughout the IGAD region, contributing significantly to domestic and international trade.**

Livestock rearing is a key livelihood activity in East Africa (ICPALD, 2024), with the Horn of Africa home to some of the largest pastoral populations in the world. Some 60–70 percent of the IGAD region's landmass is made up of arid and semi-arid lands, where pastoral and agropastoral systems are the main source of livelihoods (IGAD, February 2024). The numbers of people active in pastoralism ranges from over half of the population in South Sudan and Somalia to 30–40 percent in Djibouti and 10–20 percent in the other countries (Mkutu, 2018). Agropastoral populations, engaged in both cropping and livestock-rearing activities, are also common across semi-arid areas of the region. An estimated 488 million cattle, sheep, goats, and camels are found in the region, of which over 60 percent are in dryland areas (IGAD, February 2024).

The livestock sector significantly contributes to export revenues, national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the broader socioeconomic development of IGAD countries. Around 10 to 50 percent of country-level agricultural GDP comes from it (ICPALD, February 2024). Live animal and meat exports to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) from the region generate more than USD 1 billion annually in earnings (ICPALD, June 2023; FAO and IGAD, 2019).

**Pastoral livelihoods can provide income and food to sustain household food security**

Among pastoral communities, herd sizes are a key determinant of household wealth as they act as cash buffers (small livestock) and capital

reserves (large animals). They increase economic stability for agropastoral households and provide protection against inflation. Sale of livestock enables the purchase of food, other basic needs and services (such as education and health) (FAO). While wealthier pastoral households obtain the majority of their income from livestock, poorer pastoralists must complement livestock-related income with labour and social support from community members (FEWS NET, 2015; FSNAU, 2011).

The livestock sector is crucial for enhancing the food security, nutrition and resilience of pastoral households in the IGAD region (FAO, 2020; FAO, no date<sup>1</sup>, IFAD 2020). Livestock products, such as milk and meat, complement consumption of purchased cereals and provide high quality proteins, essential fatty acids, and various vitamins and minerals, contributing to healthy diets and improved nutrition, particularly for children (FAO, 2023). Children and pregnant women living in nomadic households in northern Kenya have been found to have better nutritional outcomes than sedentary households in the same area, due to improved access to camel milk (Fratkin et al, 2006).

**Successive shocks have undermined pastoralist livelihoods**

While at the macroeconomic level pastoralism was performing well before the 2020–2023 drought, increasing commercialisation of pastoral production is already leading to privatisation of resources, including water and rangelands. This limits the capacity of smaller herders to access critical resources in times of need and to increase herd size, leading to their abandonment of pastoralism. In some areas, increased commercialisation has also



In recent years, pastoralists in South Sudan have seen their only source of income – livestock – decimated by conflict, cattle raiding, atypical flooding and consequent diseases that they have no means to treat.

affected gender roles where men take control of livestock assets that were previously controlled or managed by women (Catley et al, 2016). Shocks, including droughts, flooding and conflict, affect access to water, pasture and markets, and risk triggering resource-based conflict and exacerbating intercommunal tensions. Cattle raids, farm destruction and disruptions to veterinary services and disease control can decimate livestock herds, impoverishing households and driving displacement. In South

Sudan, insecurity and cattle raids have reduced livestock productivity through disruption of normal grazing and watering patterns. Subsequent atypical migrations have heightened the risk of livestock pests and diseases, negatively impacting livestock production and reproduction. This has in turn reduced household food availability and driven up malnutrition among breastfeeding women and children under 5 years of age due to reduced dietary diversity and insufficient milk (FAO DIEM, January 2024). In Uganda's Karamoja

## Focus on pastoralism

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In the vast lowland part of Ethiopia in South Omo zone, pastoralists have suffered frequent droughts forcing them to travel long distances in search of water for their livestock.

subregion, food availability is a major challenge partly due to sustained cattle raids that have led to the dwindling of livestock holdings. In almost all districts (except Amudat and Nabilatuk) fewer than 50 percent of households own livestock, a stark reduction from even five years ago (IPC, June 2024).

The increasing frequency and severity of climate-related shocks, exacerbated by climate change, contributes additional pressure. During the 2008 and 2011 droughts, Ethiopia lost 52 percent and 23 percent of its animals respectively. During the 2017 drought, Somalia lost USD 400 million in revenue from decreased export of live animals (ICPALD, June 2023). The unprecedented 2020–2023 drought across the Horn of Africa then killed an estimated 13.2 million heads of livestock,

including 6.8 million in Ethiopia, 2.6 million in Kenya and 3.8 million in Somalia.

During the drought, over 1.4 million children aged under 5 were estimated to have lost access to milk, with a severe impact on their nutrition status. IPC analyses from that period show that many of the areas that faced the highest levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition were pastoral or agropastoral.

SMART surveys conducted in Kenya found acute malnutrition levels of 35 percent, above the Famine threshold, in parts of Mandera and Turkana county. Reduction in milk availability due to the drought, as well as respiratory tract and water-borne diseases, were key drivers (FSNWG, 2022).

Flood events, such as those observed during the

2023 October–November–December (OND) and 2024 March–April–May rainy (MAM) seasons cause loss of livestock and extensive population displacements in pastoral areas (OCHA, 2024). The extensive flooding in April and early May 2024 led to about 13 900 livestock deaths in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia (OCHA, May 2024; WFP, May 2024). Heavy rainfall and flooding also increases the risk of livestock diseases, such as Rift Valley Fever (CDC 2024), health-related market closures and trade bans (Peyre et al. 2013; Mburu et al. 2022).

### **The end of regional drought in 2023, but recovery can take years and localized shocks continued into 2024**

In early 2023, pastoral and agropastoral areas of the Horn of Africa were suffering from the impacts of the historic three-year drought, including poor rangeland conditions, limited water availability for livestock, widespread livestock mortality, and high food insecurity rates (FSNWG, 2023).

Rains improved during the March–May 2023 season, marking the end of the drought in many areas (OCHA, 2023) but during the following October–December 2023 and March–May 2024 rainy seasons, floods caused widespread livestock deaths. Pastoralist livelihood recovery relies on increasing herd sizes through animal reproduction or procurement of stock and takes time. Some estimates suggest that recovery can take over five years (OCHA 2023) and can be difficult to impossible for smallholder pastoral families (Catley et al, 2016).

In other parts of the region, rains in late 2023 and early 2024 were not evenly distributed and dry spells and/or below-average rains were observed in parts of the Sudan, the Karamoja region of Uganda, South Sudan and northern Ethiopia (FAO, 2024; FEWS NET, 2024; IPC, 2024).

Livestock diseases, cattle raids and resource-based conflicts also continued to limit recovery and constrain pastoralism across the region (IPC, 2024), including in the Greater Darfur region of the Sudan where fighting and insecurity have restricted access to grazing lands and water (FAO, 2024).

The increasing frequency of shocks suggests that many pastoralist households are unlikely to recover their livelihoods and resilience before the next shock strikes. This drives pastoral migration into cities which in turn leads to poor outcomes including poverty and food insecurity, with one study from Marsabit, Kenya also reporting poor subjective well being, even years after livelihood transition (Duijne, 2024).

### **Lack of actionable information continues to undermine development of this critical livelihood**

Despite the importance of pastoralism to the IGAD region and its potential contribution to economic growth, poverty reduction, food security and rangeland management, the statistics necessary to inform policy development and implementation are insufficient to do so (FAO et al, 2014).

Data at the domestic, regional and international level on trade flows, health and livestock populations remain insufficient and outdated. Data that are collected are not done so systematically and are of mixed quality, particularly in terms of timeliness, completeness, comparability and accuracy. This makes it challenging to support this critical livelihood and industry, as well as the pastoral and agropastoral families that rely on it.

# Drivers of food crises across the region, 2023–2024

## The impact of climate extremes on food production in the IGAD region



While significantly above-average rainfall during the October–December 2023 and March–May 2024 rainy seasons aided drought recovery in the region, they also caused severe flooding (OCHA, 2024).

From late March through April, heavy rains led to severe flooding in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, resulting in loss of lives and livestock, displacing hundreds of thousands of people, and destroying farmlands and critical infrastructure, including roads, bridges and dams (FSNWG, April 2024).


**In 2023, climatic extremes profoundly challenged the resilience of communities**

At the beginning of the year, the Horn of Africa was suffering from the severe impacts of a three-year drought – the worst in 40 years – that devastated many livelihoods, especially pastoral.

Improved rains during the March–May 2023 season marked the end of the drought and the start of a long recovery period in many areas – though not all areas saw improved rains.

In other parts of the region such as the bimodal areas of Uganda, for example, experienced below-average and erratic March–June rains (USGS, 2023) while southeastern parts of the Sudan, northern Ethiopia, South Sudan, and unimodal areas of Uganda experienced dry spells and/or below-average June–September rainfall, negatively impacting agricultural production (GEOGLAM, 2023).

MAP 2.3 Temperature anomalies in 2023 (degrees Celsius)




Source: ICPAC.

Overall, 2023 was the warmest year on record for the IGAD region, with anomalies ranging between  $+0.5^{\circ}\text{C}$  and  $+3.0^{\circ}\text{C}$  (see map 2.3), with significant harmful implications for ecosystems, animal and human health, and agriculture. Rising temperatures can affect crop growth, reducing productivity and yields, and can also lead to a reduction in pasture and water availability

for livestock, lowering their production and productivity.

It was also the fourth wettest year in the region since 1981. Although the June to September (JJAS) season was relatively dry over the northern parts of the region, due to El Niño conditions, the March to May (MAM) and October to December

MAP 2.4 Spatial distribution of rainfall anomalies in 2023 (percentage)



Source: ICPAC.

(OND) seasons, which are mostly important for the equatorial parts of the region, were wet. Surplus rainfall ranged from 50 percent to 100 percent in certain areas (see map 2.4). For the MAM season, the wet conditions were attributed to the Madden Julian Oscillation (MJO), while the major drivers for the wet OND season included the Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) and El Niño. These above-normal rainfall conditions brought about positive prospects for food security due to more favourable crop harvests, and improved water and pasture availability for livestock. However, they also caused extensive flooding that resulted in the loss of lives and livelihoods, extensive



## Livestock production in 2023



In pastoral areas of southern **Ethiopia**, northern and eastern **Kenya**, and central and northern **Somalia**, abundant rains in 2023 and early 2024 marked the end of an exceptionally prolonged and severe drought but also resulted in widespread animal deaths.

The ample availability of water and pastures fully regenerated rangeland resources, benefiting livestock production and reproduction, which are reported at average to above-average levels. However, recovery from the drought in terms of livestock numbers will take several favourable rainy seasons due to the magnitude of animal losses (FAO-GIEWS, July 2024).

population displacement, livestock deaths and the destruction of farmlands and critical infrastructure.

The southern and southeastern parts of Ethiopia, coastal and northern Kenya, and the riverine and low-lying agro-pastoral zones of southern Somalia experienced the most significant impact. During October–December 2023, approximately 4.5 million people in Somalia (2.5 million), Ethiopia (1.5 million), and Kenya (0.5 million) were affected by floods (OCHA, 2023).

Subsequent pest outbreaks such as the African fall armyworm over Kenya, and desert locust over Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sudan posed additional challenges to crop production and pasture for livestock, further exacerbating the situation (FAO, June 2024; FAO).

The stark transition from prolonged dryness to sudden inundation highlighted the region's susceptibility to climate variability and extremes, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and straining local disaster response mechanisms.

## Cereal output by country in 2023



Aggregate cereal production in the IGAD region in 2023 is estimated at 42.8 million tonnes, about 5 percent below the average production of 2022, according to the FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (FAO-GIEWS). Reduced production in the Sudan due to the expansion and intensification of the conflict more than offset output increases in other countries that had benefited from above-average rainfall (FAO-GIEWS).

The outcome of the 2023 cropping season was favourable in **Ethiopia**, as the main Meher harvest benefited from above-average rainfall amounts in western key-growing areas of Amhara and Benishangul Gumuz regions, despite localized cereal production shortfalls in some northern areas due to insecurity, and in some central and southern areas due to insufficient rains (FAO, November 2023).

In **Kenya**, cereal production in 2023 is estimated at about 4.6 million tonnes, 18 percent up from 2022 and 4 percent above the average of the previous five years (FAO, June 2024) as crops in key growing areas of Central, Rift Valley and Western provinces, which account for the bulk of the national cereal output, benefited from average to above-average rainfall amounts (FEWS NET, December 2023).

In **Somalia**, cereal production is estimated at about 167 000 tonnes, 22 percent up from the drought-affected 2022 output and similar to the low average of the previous five years (FAO, June 2024), diminished by several consecutive poor harvests, as the main season Gu harvest was affected by an erratic temporal distribution of rain and the secondary season Deyr harvest by floods (FAO, July 2023; FAO, March 2024).

In **South Sudan**, aggregate cereal production in 2023 is estimated at about 1.03 million tonnes, around 8 percent up from the 2022 output and about 20 percent above the previous five year average (FAO, June 2024). Production benefited from overall favourable weather conditions and less extensive flooding compared with recent years, which benefited yields, and from an increase in the planted area compared with the previous year due to improved security conditions (FAO, March 2024).

In the **Sudan**, 2023 cereal production is estimated at about 4.2 million tonnes, 46 percent below that of the previous year and about 43 percent below the previous five year average (FAO, June 2024). The dismal performance of the 2023 cropping season was due to the impact of ongoing conflict, which has caused widespread insecurity, large-scale displacement, and severe shortages and soaring prices of agricultural inputs. An erratic spatial and temporal distribution of seasonal rains further diminished yields and contributed to reduced production (FAO, November 2023).

In **Uganda**, a favourable outcome of the second season harvest, gathered in November and December 2023 (FAO, March 2024), offset substantial production losses from the insufficient rains that affected first-season crops, harvested in June and July 2023. As a result, total cereal output is estimated at about 3.7 million tonnes, 13 percent higher than the low output obtained in 2022 and similar to the five-year average (FAO, June 2024).

## In 2024, while rains aided drought recovery, they also caused severe flooding

**The 2024 March–May (MAM) rainfall season marked the third consecutive season of wetter-than-normal conditions in the equatorial parts of the region, presenting positive prospects for livestock and crop production, and pointing to further recovery from the impacts of the October 2020–February 2023 drought.**

Even so, localized parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda faced increased food insecurity as heavy rains, especially in April, led to severe flooding events, causing loss of lives and livestock, displacing hundreds of thousands of people, disrupting livelihoods and destroying farmlands (OCHA, May 2024). Compared with October–December 2023, the March–May 2024 floods had a relatively lower impact, affecting 1.6 million people, primarily in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, causing population displacements and disease outbreaks (OCHA, 2024).


The rainfall outlook for the June–September (JJAS) 2024 season, which started in May, indicates increased chances of wetter conditions in parts of the Sudan, northern Ethiopia, South Sudan, western Eritrea, Djibouti, Uganda, western Kenya and coastal areas of Kenya and Somalia where JJAS is the main rainfall season (*see map 2.5*).

The wetter-than-usual conditions are likely to improve food production and availability and hence the food security situation, over the northern parts of the region, alleviating the high levels of acute food insecurity caused by the El Niño-induced below-normal rainfall during the 2023 JJAS season.

On the other hand, parts of northern Somalia, isolated areas over western Ethiopia, and western South Sudan are likely to experience drier-than-average conditions (below-normal rainfall). La Niña, which is associated with drier-than-usual



**MAP 2.5 Rainfall probabilistic forecast for June–September 2024**



**Probability of rainfall (percent)**

	Above normal	Normal	Below normal
Zone 1	65	20	15
Zone 2	55	25	20
Zone 3	45	30	25
Zone 4	25	30	45

Source: ICPAC.

conditions during the OND season in the eastern Horn of Africa, is likely from August to October 2024 and is expected to continue into 2025 (NOAA CPC, July 2024). For cropping areas such as the southeastern marginal agricultural areas of Kenya, the agro-pastoral areas of the Somali region of Ethiopia and southern Somalia, associated poor rains could cause significantly below-average or failed harvests, affecting food availability, prices and income. In pastoral areas, including Somalia and the northeast areas of Kenya, this could lead to severe water shortages and poor pasture conditions, reducing livestock productivity and value.

Looking ahead, climate extremes are expected to become more frequent and severe in the region, exacerbated by climate change. This will accelerate environmental degradation, which will in turn push down agricultural yields, increase food insecurity, heighten resource-based conflicts, and drive displacement both within and across countries.

## Cereal output forecast by country in 2024

**Abundant precipitation was received in the first half of 2024, but in some countries an erratic distribution of rains resulted in crop production shortfalls.**

In central and eastern regions of **Ethiopia**, the 2024 secondary “Belg” season harvest, gathered in June and July, is estimated at above-average levels due to an overall favourable performance of the February–May seasonal rains (FAO, July 2024).

In key growing areas of western **Kenya**, establishment and development of “long rains” crops, to be harvested from September, benefited from average to above-average rainfall amounts between March and June (FAO, July 2024).

In southern bimodal rainfall areas of **South Sudan**, cumulative rains between April and June were below-average, but the moisture deficits did not affect vegetation conditions, and prospects for the first season harvest, to be gathered from August, are generally favourable (FAO, July 2024).

By contrast, in **Somalia** and **Uganda**, the 2024 March–May seasonal rains were characterized by average to above-average cumulative rainfall amounts, but they had

an erratic temporal distribution, constraining yields of Gu and first season crops, respectively, harvested in June and July (FAO, July 2024).

According to the latest weather forecast by the Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum (GHACOF), the June–September rains are expected at above-average levels across most cropping areas of **Ethiopia**, the **Sudan**, and central and northern **South Sudan**, with foreseen positive impacts on yields of harvests to be gathered in late 2024 (FAO, July 2024).

However, in **Ethiopia**, insecurity in localized areas of Amhara and Oromia regions is expected to disrupt agricultural activities, while in the **Sudan**, the expansion of the conflict to southeastern key-producing areas in late 2023 will likely constrain plantings, while persisting shortages of agricultural inputs will continue to affect yields (FAO, July 2024).

In flood-prone areas of central-northern **South Sudan**, the above-average rains are expected to cause widespread flooding, as they will exacerbate the overflows of the river Nile caused by the release of large volumes of water from the Jinja dam in Uganda in May 2024 (FAO, July 2024).

## Conflict and insecurity



**In the year after fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 15 April 2023, ACLED recorded over 5 500 political violence events and more than 15 500 reported fatalities in the Sudan.**

Civilians in Khartoum state faced the most targeted violence, while civilians in Darfur were

twice as likely to be killed by targeted violence than those in other states (ACLED, April 2024). Besides the massive loss of life, the conflict has devastated major infrastructure and livelihoods, paralysed economic activities, triggered the world’s largest internal population displacement crisis, and severely disrupted supply chains and basic services (IPC, 2023).

In addition to the Sudan, conflict including inter-communal violence, resource based conflicts and/or cattle raiding across the region occurred in localized areas of **Somalia**, **Ethiopia**, **South Sudan**, **Uganda** and **Kenya** (FEWS NET, 2023; IPC, 2023a; IPC 2023b). This has continued to disrupt lives and livelihoods through displacement, infrastructural damage, disruptions to markets, trade flows as well as humanitarian assistance (FAO, 2023; FEWS NET, May 2024).

In southern and central regions of **Somalia**, conflict continued to cause fatalities, population displacements and property damage. It also disrupted agricultural production, markets and trade flows, and humanitarian assistance (FAO, 2023; FEWS NET, 2024; IPC, 2024).

In **Ethiopia**, increased hostilities from August 2023 in localized areas of Oromia and Amhara, caused population displacement, and disrupted livelihood and economic activities (FEWS NET, 2023).

In **South Sudan**, intercommunal violence and insecurity, particularly in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states, disrupted livelihoods, trade and humanitarian food assistance (FEWS NET, 2023).

The spillover effects of the conflict in the **Sudan** included an influx of Sudanese refugees and South Sudanese returnees in areas with already high levels of acute food insecurity and high internal displacement, including Abyei, Unity, and Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal (FEWS NET, 2023; IPC, 2023).

Persistent conflict in neighbouring countries, including Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and the Sudan, continued to drive refugees into **Uganda** (FEWS NET, 2023) while resource-based conflicts and cattle raiding continued to challenge agropastoral communities in Kenya and Uganda (IPC, 2023; IPC, 2023).

*See Spotlight on the Sudan, pages 3–4.*

## Economic shocks



**Adverse macroeconomic conditions, primarily driven by local currency depreciation, low foreign currency reserves, and a high debt burden, have continued to restrict food access across nearly all countries in the region due to elevated food prices (FSNWG, April 2024).**

However, increased food production in most countries due to favourable rains improved market supply, significantly easing staple food prices in many markets from mid-2023 through to mid-2024, except in the Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia.


The ongoing conflict in the **Sudan** has severely impacted food production and supply systems, driving food prices to historical levels in most markets over the past year. Before the onset of the conflict, food prices were already at high levels primarily driven by unfavourable macroeconomic conditions, and high production and transportation costs, which have since worsened. By May 2024, national average prices of key staples (sorghum, millet, and wheat flour) were more than double the levels of May 2023 (WFP Dataviz, 2024).

Production of sorghum and millet during the 2023/24 cropping year was 42 and 64 percent below the previous year, respectively. This is directly impacting market supply and adding inflationary pressure on prices. Wheat prices also recorded increasing trends despite declining international prices, reflecting the effects of rapid currency depreciation on prices of imported foods as well as conflict-related logistics challenges.

The exchange rate in the parallel market, which has become the standard for the Sudan's economic activity, reached 1 850 Sudanese Pounds (SDG) per USD in June 2024 (IPC, June 2024).

In **South Sudan**, prices of maize and sorghum soared in most markets, primarily driven by deteriorating macroeconomic conditions and

**FIG. 2.7 Food inflation increased sharply in early 2024 in South Sudan, remained stubbornly high in Ethiopia and slowed elsewhere in the region**



Data were not available for Sudan after February 2023.

other factors such as localized conflict and high transportation costs.

The country heavily relies on imports, and an abrupt depreciation of the national currency in the first quarter of 2024 following a reduction of oil exports due to damages to the pipelines passing through the Sudan and disruptions in oil shipments via the Red Sea further fuelled food inflation (FAO, July 2024).


Between June 2023 and June 2024, the national average price of maize and sorghum increased by more than 70 percent, with most markets recording cereal prices more than double the levels a year earlier (WFP Dataviz, 2024).

In **Ethiopia**, retail prices of maize were stable in some markets, while in others they declined

by 10 to 15 percent between February and April as traders released their stocks in advance of the secondary Belg harvest. Prices were up to 50 percent higher year-on-year in April, mainly due to the continuous depreciation of the national currency, as well as increasing production and transport costs (FAO, July 2024).

In **Somalia**, prices of locally-produced sorghum declined by 30 to 40 percent between December 2023 and April 2024 in key producing areas of the Bay region, with the commercialization of the 2023 Deyr harvest. By contrast, prices of maize remained unseasonably firm over the same period in the main producing areas of Lower Shabelle, due to significant crop losses following widespread floods. In general, prices of coarse grains were up to 40 percent lower year-on-year in April 2024, in

**FIG. 2.8 Highest annual food inflation rate by country, 2024**



Source: Trading Economics, 2024.

part, attributed to the delivery of food assistance, which has exerted downward pressure on prices (FAO, July 2024).

The year-on-year change in the price of staple maize declined considerably in Uganda and Kenya, with latest price levels in June 2024 40–56 percent below year-earlier levels (WFP Dataviz, 2024).

In **Djibouti**, food prices remained relatively stable over the past year owing to stable macroeconomic conditions and the government's price control on key commodities.

While sorghum and wheat prices slightly declined, the price of imported rice has been on an upward trend since January 2024, with the prices of most rice varieties increasing between April and May before slightly easing in June (WFP Dataviz, 2024).

# Structural vulnerabilities in the IGAD region, 2023–2024

Countries in the IGAD region are characterized by significant structural vulnerabilities – environmental, economic and socio-political – that increase their exposure to shocks and impede their ability to address acute food insecurity.

All IGAD member states with major food crises, except Kenya, are designated as Least Developed Countries by the United Nations (UNCTAD, January 2024), indicating weak development capacity, low and unevenly distributed income, and scarce financial resources. These vulnerabilities result in low Human Development Index (HDI) scores (OPHI/UNDP, 2022).

Poverty is deeply entrenched in the region, with half of the population surviving on less than USD 1 per day (IGAD, 2016). South Sudan and Ethiopia have the highest poverty levels, with 90 percent and 80 percent of their populations, respectively, living in multidimensional poverty (OPHI, 2020). High poverty levels, particularly among rural populations, and dependence on food imports make populations more vulnerable to both national and global crises and make it difficult for vulnerable populations to afford food amid high prices (OPHI/UNDP, 2022).

Weak institutions, increasing public debt (World Bank IDS 2024), economic inequality (all IGAD member states have a Gini coefficient of over 50 percent (OWD 2022), and low literacy levels make it difficult for countries to recover from acute shocks.

Droughts in the region, particularly in the Horn of Africa have become more severe and frequent, worsened by desertification, land degradation, and climate change (IGAD, 2020). Destructive floods are recurring, exacerbated by droughts



Persistent environmental, economic and socio-political vulnerabilities underlie the protracted food crises in the IGAD region with communities unable to recover from repeated shocks.

that reduce soil water retention (WFP, December 2023). These harsh ecological conditions have led to chronic vulnerability, persistent food insecurity and economic hardships particularly for pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities in the ASALs (IGAD, 2020).

Protracted conflict and insecurity continue to threaten peace and stability in the region, with ethnic strife, violent internal and intra-state conflicts as well as other security threats such as violent extremism, terrorism and cross-border disputes and conflicts affecting many member states. These incidents result in humanitarian disasters and create barriers to development, stability and economic prosperity (IGAD, 2020).

As a result, the region hosts the largest number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) on the continent, with the Sudan now the largest internal displacement crisis globally (IOM, April 2024).

Agriculture is the main livelihood source in the region, directly supporting over 80 percent of the population and serving as the foundation for food supplies and export earnings. Multiple challenges include a high reliance on rain-fed production systems and agriculture and livestock trade with minimal value addition. Resource-based and intercommunal conflicts negatively affect rural households in the region (IGAD, July 2023).

FIG. 2.9 INFORM risk index score and risk class by country



	Global ranking	Index score	Risk class
SOMALIA	1	8.6	Very high
SOUTH SUDAN	3	8.5	Very high
SUDAN	8	7.2	Very high
ETHIOPIA	12	7	Very high
UGANDA	12	7	Very high
KENYA	21	6.5	High
ERITREA	23	6.2	High
DJIBOUTI	55	4.5	Medium

Source: Joint Research Centre of European Commission, 2024.

The **INFORM Risk Index** is a composite indicator that identifies countries at high risk of humanitarian crisis that are more likely to require humanitarian assistance.

It envisages three dimensions of risk: Hazards and Exposure (natural and human-made); Vulnerability (socioeconomic and vulnerable groups); and Lack of Coping Capacity (institutional and infrastructure).

Out of 194 countries in the index in mid 2024, 14 are considered 'Very High' risk and five of them – Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda – are in East Africa. Somalia is considered the highest risk country in the world (EC-JRC, July 2024).



# Chapter 3 | Country overviews







## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | This food crisis is not as severe as in 2023 with the number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) projected to halve between the 2023 and 2024 peaks.

### JULY–DECEMBER 2024

**0.3M** people, or 24% of the total population, were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.



The numbers are similar to the same period of 2023. Except for the city of Arta, which is expected to be in Stressed (IPC Phase 2), all other areas were projected to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). The situation is concerning in the rural parts of drought-affected Ali Sabieh, Obock, Tadjourah and Arta regions, and in the country's three refugee camps (IPC, June 2024).



Source: Djibouti IPC TWG, June 2024.

### ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY, 2016–2024

**Djibouti has been selected for all GRFC editions though not as a major food crisis.**


In 2016, an estimated 0.2 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This number decreased to 0.1 million in 2017, a decline that can be attributed to lower analysis coverage to 31 percent of the population.

In 2023, the country experienced the highest levels of acute food insecurity of the last four years. Global economic shocks contributed to increasing food prices and limited household purchasing power, while persistent drought, and flooding in rural areas exacerbated the situation (IPC, June 2023). While the severity of the situation is projected to slightly reduce in 2024, the number of people expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity is projected to remain similar to that of 2023. Pockets of drought are expected to persist in Ali Sabieh, Obock and Arta regions, and prices of fuel and imported food, including wheat, to remain high.

As a small lower-middle income country, Djibouti ranked 178 out of 204 countries and territories on the 2022 Human Development Index (UNDP). In the 2023 Global Hunger Index, it ranked 93 out of 125 countries, with a severity score categorized as serious (GHI, October 2023).

While households in most countries in the IGAD region are highly reliant on agriculture for livelihoods and subsistence, Djibouti has the lowest share, at around 2 percent, due to very low rainfall, scarcity of water resources and minimal irrigation. The country's economy relies primarily on providing port services due to its strategic location on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Less than 1 percent of the country is arable, which makes it almost entirely reliant on imports to meet its food demand (WB, December 2023). This means the pass-through from global to local food prices is significant and the relative strength of its currency has a major impact on the cost of imported food items. At 4.9, Djibouti's INFORM risk index is considered High (EC-JRC, 2024).


### Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2017 and 2020–2024




Source: Djibouti IPC TWG.

### PEAK 2023 (JULY–DECEMBER)

**0.3M** people, or 24% of the total population, were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.



This marked a nearly 50 percent increase from the same peak period in 2022. Three out of five regions were classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The worst-affected areas were rural parts of Dikhil, Obock and Tadjourah regions, where temperatures and transhumance movement significantly affected pastoralist households. The country's three refugee camps were classified in IPC Phase 3 with some populations in IPC Phase 4 (IPC, June 2023).



Source: Djibouti IPC TWG, June 2023.

## DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS

**Economic shocks** For import-dependent Djibouti, supply chain disruptions and increases in global food prices invariably cause inflationary pressure, restricting food access for poorer households. Ongoing tensions around the Red Sea could negatively impact the availability and pricing of imported commodities in 2024 (WFP, May 2024). A potential slowdown in Djibouti's port activities could lead to loss of employment and reduced household purchasing power (IMF, June 2024 and IPC, June 2024).

During the projection period of July to December 2024, the majority of regions will likely face upward trends in prices. Households that depend on the sale of animal products will likely see their sources of income diminish due to a decline in local production. In 2023, supply chain disruptions caused higher and more volatile food import prices, curtailing vulnerable households' purchasing power (WFP, October 2023).

**Weather extremes** Above-average rainfall forecast for the June–September 2024 season poses a risk of flooding, potentially disrupting livelihoods, damaging crops and destroying infrastructure (ICPAC, May 2024), while parts of Obock, Dikhil and Tadjourah regions are expected to continue experiencing drought (IPC, June 2024).

The lingering impacts of the 2020–2023 drought, which led to a 50 percent reduction in livestock numbers, severely constrained incomes and the availability of livestock products for pastoral households, contributing significantly to the deterioration of food insecurity in 2023 (FAO-GIEWS, August 2023). While the drought officially ended in early 2023, below-average rainfall in July–September 2023 and El Niño-induced heavy rainfall leading to flooding in some areas in November compromised pastoralists' recovery (FAO-GIEWS, August 2023).

## DISPLACEMENT

**0.03M** refugees and asylum-seekers by May 2024

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, May 2024.

**Refugees** The majority (71 percent) of the 31 500 refugees and asylum seekers in Djibouti are women and children. Somali nationals make up the largest refugee group in Djibouti at 43 percent, followed by Ethiopians at 41 percent, and Yemenis at 11 percent (UNHCR).


Out of 28 000 refugees living in three camps (Ali Addeh, Holl-Holl and Markazi), around 11 000 or 39 percent faced high levels of acute food insecurity. All three camps were classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In Markazi, 15 percent of the population were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In Ali Addeh, 10 percent were in this phase and in Holl-Holl, 5 percent.

Income-generating opportunities remain scarce for refugees. Access to sufficient food has been further limited by the reduction in food assistance rations, which constitute the main source of income or food for half of households in Markazi and a quarter of households in Ali Addeh and Holl Holl. Refugees have been receiving 30–40 percent of the recommended 2 100 calories a day since October 2023 due to funding shortfalls and ration cuts.

Acute malnutrition levels among children under 5 years are also very concerning in the camps. From May to December 2024, Ali Addeh and Markazi camps are projected to be in a Critical situation (IPC AMN Phase 4), and Holl-Holl in Serious (IPC AMN Phase 4) (IPC, June 2024). Food diversity is lower in the Markazi camp, where about 18 percent of households consume a maximum of two food groups. Analyses show that in Holl-Holl and Markazi, an average of 23 percent of the population has a poor FCS.

## ACUTE MALNUTRITION

JANUARY–DECEMBER 2024



**1 050** pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2024.

Source: Djibouti IPC TWG, June 2024.

**The number of acutely malnourished children under 5 years old has increased since 2023 – particularly those affected by severe acute malnutrition (+66 percent).**

From May–December 2024, three of the seven cities analysed (Arta, Balbala and Boulaos), are projected to be in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) compared with Alert (IPC AMN Phase 2) in 2023. Obock and Tadjourah are in Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3). In the five rural areas, Obock is in IPC AMN Phase 4, and the rest in IPC AMN Phase 3. Regarding refugee camps, Ali Addeh and Markazi are projected to be in IPC AMN Phase 4 and Holl-Holl in IPC AMN Phase 3 (IPC, June 2024).


## DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

**Inadequate services** Poor hygiene conditions, low access to drinking water, limited access to health services and low vaccination coverage contribute to high levels of childhood illnesses. There is a direct link between the occurrence of an episode of Acute Watery Diarrhoea leading to weight loss and the occurrence of acute malnutrition, which could have contributed significantly to the deterioration of the nutritional situation in 2024 (IPC, June 2024).


**Lack of food** Pockets of drought and decreasing household purchasing power exacerbated poor quality of food intake at the household level.

**Inadequate practices** The percentage of children aged 6–23 months receiving a Minimum Acceptable Diet ranges from 1.4 percent (deemed Extremely Critical) to 27.4 percent (deemed Serious). Only 22 percent of children under 6 months are exclusively breastfed, which is considered Critical (UNICEF) (IPC, June 2024).

## PEAK 2024 (MAY–DECEMBER)



Source: Djibouti IPC TWG, June 2024.





## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Ethiopia's food crisis has worsened since 2023 due to El Niño-induced drought conditions, flooding, intensifying conflict in localized areas and high food prices.

## JULY–DECEMBER 2024

 Up to **22.0M** people or 19% of the total population are projected to experience high levels of acute food insecurity.<sup>1</sup>

Households in eastern Amhara and Tigray are grappling with little to no food stocks following an El Niño-induced drought that led to the failure of the 2023 Meher harvest. Intensified conflict in Amhara and potential clashes with Tigray forces in disputed areas are expected to continue disrupting livelihoods and limiting movement and trade. In the pastoral south and southeast, while acute food insecurity is expected to gradually improve as households recover from the 2020–2023 drought, displaced and vulnerable households, especially in the Somali region, remain of concern (FEWS NET, April 2024).

<sup>1,2</sup> The Ethiopia figure has not been endorsed by the Government of Ethiopia.

Source: FEWS NET, April 2024.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine

 At least 25% of households meet 25–50% of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance

 At least 25% of households meet over 50% of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance

## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY, 2016–2024

Ethiopia has ranked among the ten largest food crises in terms of numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in all eight editions of the GRFC, reflecting the protracted and multidimensional nature of its food crisis.

Sources and coverage have varied over the years, challenging comparability between annual peak numbers and prevalence. However, the drivers have not, with drought being the primary factor undermining

households' access and availability to food each year except in 2020 and 2021 when economic shocks, and conflict/insecurity, respectively, dominated.

In 2023, the dire situation was further compounded by a four-month pause in US government-supported humanitarian food assistance through international pipelines due to concerns about aid diversion (FEWS NET, August 2023; WFP & FAO, November 2023) and an El Niño-induced drought in the western-

agricultural areas that resulted in a failed Meher harvest (FEWS NET, December 2023).


In the 2023 Global Hunger Index, Ethiopia ranked 101 out of 125 countries, with a severity score categorized as serious (GHI, October 2023). In 2022, it was 175th out of 192 countries in the Human Development Index, indicating a low level of development (UNDP). On the INFORM risk index, it ranked 12th and was considered at Very High risk.

## PEAK 2023 (AUGUST–SEPTEMBER)

 An estimated **19.7M** people or 17% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.<sup>2</sup>


A significant proportion of households in the pastoral south and south east, particularly southern Oromia and Somali regions, faced Emergency (IPC Phase 4) due to significant losses of livelihoods and assets, including livestock, and displacement from the 2020–2023 drought. Large food consumption gaps consistent with IPC Phase 4 were observed in Tigray (despite reduced conflict episodes following the November 2022 peace agreement) and in Amhara and Oromia, where hostilities heightened even before households could recover from the 2020–2022 conflict (FEWS NET, August 2023).

## DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS

 **Weather extremes** In the north, as households were still recovering from the 2020–2022 conflict, El Niño-induced drought during the June–September 2023 rainfall season led to a failed Meher harvest, especially in Tigray and northeastern Amhara, and poor pasture and severe water shortages in Afar. This pushed numerous households into Emergency (IPC Phase 4), and those worst affected into Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) (FEWS NET, December 2023).

In the south and southeast pastoral areas, the March–May 2024 rains marked the third consecutive season of wetter-than-normal conditions, indicating continued recovery from the 2020–2023 drought (FSNWG, April 2024). However, flooding, in Afar, Oromia, Somali and SNNPR regions affected over 590 000 people, with 60 000 hectares of cropland damaged and 2 900 livestock lost (OCHA, May 2024). The heavy October–December 2023 rains – linked to El Niño – (OCHA, November 2023) had affected over 1 million people and caused significant damage to infrastructure and loss of livestock (OCHA, May 2024).

La Niña, associated with drier-than-usual conditions in the pastoral south and south east, is likely from August to October 2024 and is expected to continue into 2025 (NOAA CPC, July 2024; OCHA, May 2024).


 **Conflict/insecurity** Increased hostilities from August 2023 in localized areas of Oromia and Amhara, continue to drive population displacement, and disrupt typical livelihood and economic activities (FEWS NET, December 2023). In Amhara, conflict is expected to persist at a higher intensity than previously projected through September 2024 (FEWS NET, April 2024). Though the November 2022 peace agreement improved security and allowed for gradual economic

## DISPLACEMENT

 **IDPs** By the end of 2023, close to 2.9 million people were internally displaced due to conflict and violence, down from 3.9 million in 2022, and 881 000 due to disasters, a 23 percent increase from 2022 and the third highest figure globally (IDMC).

The country recorded 794 000 new displacements due to conflict and violence in 2023, down from 2 million in 2022. The improved security situation in Tigray, following the November 2022 peace agreement, allowed hundreds of thousands of people to return to their homes, but violence triggered 407 000 displacements in Amhara and 140 000 in Oromia regions.


In southern and southeastern parts, 550 000 people were displaced by severe El Niño-related floods, with the Somali region most affected.

 **Refugees** Ethiopia is one of the world's largest refugee-hosting countries, with women and children making up 80 percent of the refugee population. South Sudanese account for 40 percent of Ethiopia's refugees, followed by Somalis (34 percent), Eritreans (17 percent) and Sudanese (5 percent). In 2023, 140 000 refugees and asylum-seekers crossed from the Sudan and Somalia (UNHCR, April 2024).

Based on the 2023 UNHCR SENS, half of all refugee children under 5 years were undernourished (wasted,

recovery in Tigray and Afar, tensions persisted (FEWS NET, August 2023) with income-generating opportunities significantly below pre-conflict levels in 2023 (FAO-GIEWS, June 2023).

 **Economic shocks** Low government revenue and foreign currency reserves, and local currency devaluation continue to limit Ethiopia's ability to import commodities like food and fuel, resulting in double-digit inflation in 2024. In June 2024, annual food inflation stood at 22.7 percent (Trading Economics; FEWS NET, April 2024). Seasons of below-average harvests for key staples due to drought and localized conflicts in 2023 put inflationary pressure on already elevated food prices (FEWS NET, June 2023).



Source: GRID 2024, May 2024; UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, May 2024.


stunted, underweight and/or micronutrient deficient). The GAM prevalence was High by WHO thresholds at 14.2 percent, with no notable change from 2022. Anaemia prevalence among refugee children under 5 years was considered a Severe public health problem, exceeding 40 percent (UNHCR, 2023).

WFP's December 2023 Post-distribution Monitoring (PDM) reported 65 percent of refugee households were moderately food insecure up from 43 percent in 2022. The proportion of severely food-insecure refugee households remained the same at 11 percent. Despite the resumption of food aid, food rations only meet 60 percent of dietary needs, with risks of pipeline breaks in the absence of adequate funding (WFP, December 2023).

Due to the conflict in the Sudan, thousands of Ethiopian refugees have returned, with the majority residing in the Tigray region (UNHCR, April 2024).

## ACUTE MALNUTRITION

### JANUARY–DECEMBER 2024



 **1.3M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2024.**

Source: HNO 2024, February 2024.


High levels of acute malnutrition persist in the conflict and drought-affected north, and in the south and southeast, where floods have slowed recovery from the 2020–23 drought. In Tigray, late 2023 screening data showed Extremely Critical acute malnutrition levels (FEWS NET, February 2024). Malnutrition levels were even higher among IDPs in sites, with surveys indicating a GAM prevalence of 26.5 percent (Ethiopia Nutrition Cluster, February 2024).


In Amhara, rapid nutrition assessments in Wag Himra Zone and two woredas of North Gondar found Extremely Critical malnutrition levels (FEWS NET, February 2024). In drought-affected areas of Amhara, about 343 000 children were estimated to be moderately malnourished and nearly 36 000 severely malnourished, indicating a GAM prevalence of 20.8 percent, well above the 15 percent Very High WHO threshold (OCHA, June 2024).


In Somali region's Adadle (January 2024), GAM prevalence was Very High at 17.3 percent (OCHA, June 2024). Notably, over 65 percent of the nearly 119 000 SAM cases in 2023 originated from flood- and drought-affected areas like Liben, Dawa, Afder and Shabelle zones (FEWS NET, February 2024). Rapid nutrition assessments

in South Ethiopia (February 2024) and Central Ethiopia (April 2024) also show high proxy GAM prevalence, with West Soro, for instance, reporting a prevalence of about 26 percent (OCHA, June 2024).

### DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

 **Lack of food** Food insecurity is a major factor. In drought-affected regions like Afar, Amhara, Oromia and Tigray, access to nutritious food is limited, leading to increased vulnerability to malnutrition, particularly among children and pregnant and breastfeeding women (OCHA, June 2024).

 **Inadequate practices** Only 11 percent of children aged 6–23 months consume a Minimal Acceptable Diet, considered Critical. Fewer than 6 percent in Tigray received a Minimum Acceptable Diet, considered Extremely Critical (SMART, August 2023).

 **Inadequate services** Accessing healthcare services, such as maternal and child health care, immunisation programmes, and malnutrition treatment, remains challenging in many parts of Ethiopia, particularly in remote and underserved areas. This limits the prevention and early detection of malnutrition and its complications (Ethiopia Nutrition Cluster, February 2024).


WASH services are under strain because of persisting epidemics and displacement induced by conflict, drought and flooding, as well as the influx of refugees fleeing conflict in the Sudan since April 2023 (UNICEF, November 2023; IOM DTM Ethiopia, June 2023).

Communicable diseases, such as cholera, measles and malaria, pose a serious threat to the health and nutrition status of Ethiopia's population, especially children and women. By May 2024, over 46 800 cholera cases were reported across eight regions, particularly in the drought- and flood-affected areas. Close to 100 Woredas had been affected by measles by the end of April 2024, significantly increasing the risk of morbidity and mortality among children (OCHA, June 2024).


**ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Severity in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) peaked in the first half of 2023 after the multi-year drought, but significantly improved with good rainfall.**

## FEBRUARY–MARCH 2024

**1.9M** people in ASALs or 12% of the analysed population were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.



This marks a significant improvement since 2023 with a 64 percent decline in the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity due to abundant rainfall improving crop and livestock production. However, persisting high food prices coupled with the impacts of El Niño-induced floods and localized resource-based conflicts continued to drive acute food insecurity across the ASALs. By April–June, the number was projected to decrease further to 1.2 million people (IPC, March 2024).



Source: Kenya IPC TWG, March 2024.

## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY, 2019–2024

The ASALs of Kenya have been categorized as a **food crisis** in all eight editions of the GRFC and as a **major food crisis** for the last seven editions.


The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased continually between 2020 and 2023 both in terms of magnitude (from 1.9 to 5.4 million people) and severity with a threefold increase in the number of people in IPC AFI Phase 4 (Emergency).

Multiple compounding shocks led to the increase. From 2020, the purchasing power of the most vulnerable households was weakened by the economic fallout of COVID-19. The enduring effects of the 2020–2023 drought and its impact on crop and livestock production severely affected agro-pastoralist households who saw their resilience to climate shocks

eroded. Disruptions in supply chains of agricultural inputs linked to the war in Ukraine coupled with local currency depreciation and sustained high prices of imported commodities such as fuel raised food production costs, contributing to lower productivity, higher prices and weakening household purchasing power.

Three consecutive good rainy seasons since the March–May 2023 period marked the end of the 2020–2023 prolonged drought, leading to significant improvements in food security in the ASALs in 2024. Both the severity and magnitude of food insecurity returned to levels observed in 2020. However, heavy rainfall-induced flooding in March–May 2024 may lead to localized pockets of food insecurity in the upcoming months.


## Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2019–2024




Source: Kenya IPC TWG.

## PEAK 2023 (MARCH–JUNE)

**5.4M** people in the ASALs or 32% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.



This was the highest in the history of IPC analyses in the country, exceeding the record high of the previous year due to the cumulative effects of five consecutive poor rainy seasons, below-average crop production, poor livestock conditions and diseases, soaring food commodity prices and weak household purchasing power. It also marked the highest number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Garissa, Mandera, Marsabit, Turkana and Wajir counties were worst affected and all classified in IPC Phase 4 (IPC, February 2023).



Source: Kenya, IPC TWG, February 2023.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Population analysed Population not analysed Total population



## Kenya (specific areas) !

## DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS (2023-2024)


**Weather extremes** Abundant precipitation during the March–May 2023 rainy season brought an end to the prolonged 2020–2023 drought in the ASALs. The March–May 2024 long rains marked the third consecutive above-average rainfall season and contributed to the recovery of water levels, rangelands and pastures, and boosted agricultural production. However, household income had not recovered from the previous years' low agricultural and livestock production (FEWS NET, April 2024). The heavy rains at times hampered drought recovery. Storms in May 2024 caused river flooding, affecting 21 counties and displacing more than 280 000 people. As of mid-May 2024, 66 000 hectares of cropland were flooded and almost 10 000 head of livestock had died (OCHA, May 2024).

Despite localized losses due to flooding and a fall armyworm infestation, total cereal production for 2023 was estimated to be 10 percent higher than the previous year (FAO, March 2024), though bean harvests may be below average due to waterlogging. The exceptional March–May 2024 rains led to localized livestock losses, increased pest and disease outbreaks, and disrupted supply routes, which impacted staple food prices and market functionality across the ASALs.

**Economic shocks** Strong production during the 2023 October–December rainy season helped ease prices of locally produced food (WFP, March 2024) and the cost of imports from Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania (FEWS NET, April 2024). Annual food inflation declined from 12.8 percent in January 2023 to 5.6 percent in April 2024 (Trading Economics, May 2024). Nevertheless, food prices remained almost 30 percent higher than the five-year average in the first quarter of 2024 due to high transportation costs, low stocks, local currency depreciation and high production costs (WFP, May 2024).

**Conflict/insecurity** Human-wildlife and resource-based conflicts in most ASAL counties lead to livestock losses and reduced access to land for agro-pastoralists (IPC, September 2023).

## DISPLACEMENT



Source: GRID 2024, May 2024; UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, May 2024.

**Refugees** A 13 percent increase in refugee arrivals between mid-2022 and 2023 added further strain to limited resources, elevating food security needs (WFP, March 2024).

Refugees and asylum seekers are mainly from Somalia (54 percent), South Sudan (33 percent) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (6 percent) and around 87 percent reside in camps in two of the country's poorest and most food-insecure counties – Garissa on the border with Somalia (Dadaab camp) and Turkana on the border with South Sudan (Kakuma and Kalobeyei camps). The remainder (13 percent) resides in Nairobi (UNHCR, 2024).

Refugees face limited access to livelihoods and economic opportunities and are highly dependent on humanitarian assistance. Half of refugee households across Dadaab, Kakuma and Kalobeyei camps were food insecure according to WFP (CARI), with slightly more than 3 percent severely acutely food insecure. Only 16.7 percent had good dietary diversity – meaning most were consuming only cereals and pulses and using oil to cook their food, while nearly 80 percent had inadequate micronutrient intake (WFP, December 2023).

**IDPs** By early 2023, nearly 465 700 people had been internally displaced in the five counties affected by prolonged drought (IOM, November 2023). Between early October and mid-December 2023, flooding displaced around 546 000 people (OCHA, December 2023) and between March and May 2024, it displaced more than 293 000 people who needed emergency food, shelter and water, and sanitation infrastructure (Kenya Red Cross, May 2024; OCHA May 2024).

## ACUTE MALNUTRITION

## Better food security, higher food stocks and effective emergency responses improved the nutrition situation

since 2023 when many counties in Kenya's drought-stricken ASALs were classified in Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5) or Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) in March–May. However, acute malnutrition remains prevalent due to the cumulative net effect of the failed previous seasons and poor infant feeding practices, among other factors, with Turkana South remaining in IPC AMN Phase 5. The prevalence of acute malnutrition was expected to improve through June 2024 although most counties remain in the same IPC AMN phases.


## DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

**Lack of food** Poor food consumption in 2023 was a major driver, particularly lack of milk in pastoral drought-affected areas where milk accounts for a considerable component of children's diets (IPC, February 2023).

**Inadequate services** In the third quarter of 2023, reduced humanitarian assistance worsened the effects of flash floods, which disrupted health services and contaminated surface water. Vitamin A supplementation and immunization coverage among children under 5 years fell below the 80 percent national target in four counties. The prevalence of diarrhoea, upper respiratory infections and malaria among young children in Garissa, Wajir, Tana River, Isiolo and Samburu increased. Measles outbreaks occurred in Turkana West, Garissa and Mandera (IPC, March 2024). Water contamination as a result of the floods triggered a fourth cholera wave with 42 cases reported in Tana River by early May, with 47 percent of cases among children aged between 1 and 10 years (UNICEF, May 2024).


**Inadequate practices** In 2024, sub-optimal feeding practices and dietary intake, a high-risk factor for acute malnutrition, remain a challenge, with fewer than 35 percent of children aged 6–23 months in ASAL counties receiving a minimum acceptable diet (IPC, March 2024). This level is considered Alert by Infant Feeding in Emergencies (IFE) Core Group thresholds.

## PEAK (OCTOBER 2023–FEBRUARY 2024)



**124 400 pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2024.**

## PEAK 2024 (OCTOBER 2023–FEBRUARY 2024)




Source: Kenya IPC TWG, March 2024.


## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Despite major improvements since 2023, food security concerns persist, driven by recurrent weather extremes, ongoing conflict and low household purchasing power.

### JANUARY–MARCH 2024

**4.0M** people, or 21% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.



This marked improvement since 2023 is attributed to the impact of increased rainfall and sustained humanitarian assistance, but the lingering impacts of the 2020–2023 drought, high food prices, conflict and riverine flooding in April and May 2024 raise concerns in localized areas (FSNWG, April 2024). No populations were projected in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in 2024.



Source: Somalia IPC TWG, February 2024.

### ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY, 2016–2024


Somalia is a protracted major food crisis having been classified as a major food crisis in all editions of the GRFC. Between 2020 and 2023, the number of people experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity more than trebled from 2.1 million to 6.6 million, while the number in IPC Phase 4 surged from 0.4 million to 1.9 million. The population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) peaked in the last quarter of 2022 (214 000).

Several years before the launch of the GRFC, in 2011, Somalia experienced a Famine that resulted in the death of nearly 260 000 people. In 2017, Famine was prevented by large-scale humanitarian assistance

(IPC, December 2022). Somalia faced a risk of Famine in 2022 and 2023, particularly among populations in rural areas of Bay and Bakool regions and in IDP camps. It was averted through the provision of multisectoral assistance as well as the positive impact of Gu rains in 2023 (IPC, April 2023).

The country ranks second on the list of countries with the highest exposure to hazards, with severe droughts affecting one in every two seasons over the past seven years (EC-JRC ASAP). Somalia faces weak development capacity, low and unequal incomes, and scarce financial resources (UNCTAD, January 2024).

### Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2019–2024



Source: Somalia IPC TWG.


### DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS (2023–2024)

**Weather extremes** In 2023, households remained highly vulnerable to food insecurity following the three-year drought and poor 2022 cereal harvest, which reduced food stocks and milk supply, and led to the death of up to 3.8 million livestock. Pastoral communities' livelihoods were severely affected (FEWS NET, April 2023;


FAO-GIEWS, April 2023; FSNWG, March 2023). During the October–December 2023 Deyr season, El Niño-induced erratic rainfall caused flooding, displacement and crop destruction. The early end to the season's rainfall hindered crop production and prolonged the effects of the previous drought (IPC, February 2024).

### PEAK 2023 (APRIL–JUNE)

**6.6M** people or 39% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.



The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity was the highest in the eight-year history of the GRFC, around 1 million more than in 2022, due to the impacts of the 2020–2023 drought, record-high food prices, and conflict. Around 40 400 people were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Bakool, Bay, Galgaduud, Middle Shabelle, Mudug and Togdheer, but this number was significantly lower than the 214 100 in the 2022 peak period. A projected risk of Famine among IDPs in Mogadishu and Baidoa, and agropastoral groups in Burhakaba, however, did not materialise due to the positive impact of the 2023 Gu rains and humanitarian assistance (IPC, April 2023).



Source: Somalia IPC TWG, April 2023.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

At least 25% of households meet 25–50% of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance

At least 25% of households meet over 50% of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance


Urban settlement classification

IDPs/other settlements classification

As of May 2024, heavy Gu-season rains and flooding had affected 268 400 people across Banadir, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, Puntland and Southwest states through loss of livelihoods, livestock and cropland, and destruction of small businesses (OCHA, May 2024; WFP, May 2024). Floods also destroyed over half of the early sorghum crops in Bay, Shabelle, Juba and Gedo regions, causing complete crop failure along the Juba and Shabelle rivers, impacting income and food security.

**Conflict/insecurity** Conflict in Hiiraan and parts of Lower and Middle Shabelle and Juba regions caused loss of life, displacement, property damage, and disruptions to crop planting (FAO, September 2023; FEWS NET, June 2023). In the south and central regions, the escalation of hostilities in urban areas and along trade routes disrupted food and income access, Gu

## DISPLACEMENT



Source: GRID 2024, May 2024; UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, May 2024.

**IDPs** Conflict and violence have been the main triggers of internal displacement in Somalia for three decades, but drought and flooding are increasingly forcing people to leave their homes. The number of conflict displacements in 2023 increased for a fourth consecutive year to reach 673 000, particularly in Laas Aanood, in the northern Sool region, as well as in central regions of Galgaduug, Mudug and Middle Shabelle. Somalia remains among the ten countries with the highest number of conflict IDPs globally (IOM, May 2024).

Drought triggered 331 000 displacements in early 2023, mostly in the southern regions of Bay, Gedo and Lower Shabelle, while severe flooding triggered 1.7 million movements, making 2023 Somalia's highest disaster-related displacement year (IOM, May 2024). Over 216 000 people were displaced in the first five months of

season cultivation, trade, and population movement, raising transportation costs and hindering households' access to livelihood opportunities and humanitarian assistance (FEWS NET, April 2024; IPC, February 2024).

**Economic shocks** From April to June 2023, staple food prices declined but remained above the long-term average, constraining household purchasing power due to reduced domestic production and livelihood erosion. Currency depreciation also raised prices for imported foods (WFP, July 2023; FEWS NET, April 2023). Between September and December 2023, prices of locally produced sorghum and maize increased by 10–35 percent. However, by December 2023, prices dropped to 10–30 percent lower year-on-year in several markets due to the delivery of humanitarian food assistance (FAO-GIEWS, March 2024).

2024, mainly by flooding in Hiiraan or conflict/insecurity. The key needs for newly displaced people were food followed by shelter and water (UNHCR, June 2024).

The plight of IDPs is characterized by poverty, limited resources and dependence on humanitarian assistance, leading to acute food insecurity. Around 35 percent of the 4 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in January–March 2024 were IDPs. In April–June 2024, most IDP settlements were expected to experience IPC Phase 3 due to limited purchasing power, flooding and reduced food assistance. IDPs in urban areas in Sool and Galgaduud, and in Bay and Bakool region were expected to face IPC Phase 4 (IPC, February 2024).

**Refugees** The majority of refugees and asylum-seekers are from Ethiopia (65 percent), followed by Yemen (29 percent) and live in urban or peri-urban settings among local communities across the northern Woqooyi Galbeed and Bari regions. They have limited access to livelihood opportunities (UNHCR, 2024). Over 9 000 former refugees returned from their countries of asylum between January 2020 and March 2024, mostly from Yemen and Kenya (UNHCR, 2024). Cash assistance is provided to newly arrived refugees, asylum seekers and returnees for the first six months only.

## ACUTE MALNUTRITION

**Recurring drought, flooding, conflict, displacement and limited access to healthcare and nutritious food drive an extremely concerning situation**, although better milk availability and access to humanitarian assistance improved acute malnutrition in 2022 and 2023. Out of 50 population groups, 20 were classified in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4).

### DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024


**Lack of food** Poor food consumption in 2023 was a major driver, particularly lack of milk for children in pastoral drought-affected areas. Between April and June 2024, more livestock births were expected in pastoral areas, contributing to herd growth and access to milk for consumption and sale (IPC, February 2024).

**Inadequate services** The healthcare system is severely challenged by shortages of healthcare workers, medical supplies and poor infrastructure. Vitamin A supplementation and measles vaccination rates were low in more than 30 assessed areas and lowest in Shabelle Agropastoral. Displacement also hinders access to healthcare and nutritional support.

In 2023, only 53 percent of the population could access safe water and 28 percent improved sanitation facilities. The 2023 El Niño-induced floods destroyed much of the country's critical WASH infrastructure and continue to hamper access to clean drinking water in 2024, exposing many flood-affected communities to waterborne diseases such as acute watery diarrhoea and cholera. The highest levels of illness, such as acute respiratory infections/cough and acute watery diarrhoea, were among Galkayo IDP children (48.8 percent) (IPC, February 2024).

**Inadequate practices** At the national level, only 9.5 percent of children assessed by the REACH 2023 Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment-MSNA (June–August 2023) were receiving a Minimum Acceptable Diet (IPC, February 2024). This level is considered Extremely Critical by the IFE Core Group.

### JANUARY–DECEMBER 2024




Source: Somalia IPC TWG, February 2024.

**0.4M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2023.**

Source: Somalia HRP 2023, February 2023.

### PEAK 2024 (MARCH–JUNE 2024)




Source: Somalia IPC TWG, March 2024.






**ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY** | While the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity was projected to decrease between 2023 and 2024, the number in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) was expected to rise.

## APRIL–JULY 2024



This is a slight reduction from the 2023 peak, attributable to a favourable 2023/24 harvest following above-average rains in most areas. The number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) was expected to rise to 79 000 with 28 000 of them returnee refugees from the Sudan. Key drivers include depleted food stocks, high food prices, poor market functionality, limited income opportunities, and increased water-borne diseases. Mitigating factors include the seasonal availability of livestock products, wild foods and fish (IPC November, 2023).



Source: South Sudan, IPC TWG, November 2023.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY, 2016–2024

South Sudan has been classified as a major food crisis in all eight editions of the GRFC. Between 2020 and 2023, the number of people experiencing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) consistently rose, from 6.5 million to 7.8 million people, with the percentage of population facing high levels of acute food insecurity increasing from 55 percent to 63 percent. Further, the number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) rose from 1.7 million to 2.9 million.

Each year since 2017, at least half of South Sudan's population has faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the April–July lean period, rising to over 60 percent from 2021 to 2023.


There was a Famine declaration in 2017, and risk of Famine and Famine Likely situations both in 2020 and 2021, with populations in Catastrophe (IPC AFI Phase 5) each year since 2016, including outside the lean period in 2020. The highest number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) was 155 000, in May–July 2018.

This sustained deterioration in acute food insecurity has mainly been driven by sporadic subnational intercommunal conflict and insecurity, deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, and extensive flooding and drought, compounded by cumulative effects of prolonged years of asset depletion and the loss of livelihoods that continue to erode the coping capacities of households (FAO, January 2024; GRFC, 2023).

South Sudan ranked 192 of the 193 countries in the 2022 Human Development Index (HDI), a reflection of poor health, limited education opportunities and low standard of living (UNDP).


In 2024, the country received a Very High INFORM risk score, reflecting its highly limited ability to respond to disasters based on hazard exposure, socioeconomic vulnerability and institutional coping capacity (EC-JRC). The economy's modest recovery from the civil war was disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic and recurrent flooding.

## Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024




Source: South Sudan IPC TWG.

## PEAK 2023 (APRIL–JULY)




The 2023 peak numbers barely changed since the same lean season period in 2022. The most food-insecure populations were in locations significantly affected by frequent flooding and dry spells, the economic crisis, and conflict and insecurity – including the spillover effects of the conflict in the Sudan (IPC, November 2023). Around 43 000 people were projected in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Akobo, Canal/Pigi and Fangak counties of Jonglei state, and Leer and Mayendit counties of Unity state due to persistent flooding and conflict (FEWS NET, June 2023).





Source: South Sudan, IPC TWG, November 2022.

## DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS (2023–2024)


 **Economic shocks** South Sudan's macroeconomic conditions worsened due to significant oil revenue losses from a ruptured main oil pipeline in the Sudan in February 2024. This exacerbated exchange rate volatility and, combined with new customs and border fees, drove up import costs, leading to atypically high food and fuel prices. Rising costs especially hit urban areas where market dependence is highest (FEWS NET April 2024).

High fuel prices, transportation costs, and reduced trade from the Sudan have also driven up staple food prices, limiting economic access to food (FAO-GIEWS, April 2024; IPC, November 2023).


 **Conflict/insecurity** Sub national insecurity – including cattle raids, resource-based conflicts, sexual and gender-based violence and looting of humanitarian assistance – underpins food insecurity. Intercommunal violence, particularly in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states, disrupts livelihoods, trade and humanitarian food assistance for vulnerable households (FEWS NET, June 2023). The influx of Sudanese refugees and South Sudanese returnees in areas with already high levels of acute food insecurity and high internal displacement, including Abyei, Unity, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Bahr el Ghazal, have put additional pressure on scarce food and income sources, as well as on limited humanitarian assistance, and created localized tension (FEWS NET, 2023; IPC November 2023).


 **Weather extremes** Erratic distribution of rains in 2023 reduced crop production in some areas. Cereal production was higher than in 2022 due to less flooding, but it did not meet the population's needs (FAO/WFP CFSAM, 2023). In April 2024, abundant rainfall disrupted planting operations in central and northern unimodal rainfall areas. Another major flood event is expected during the second half of 2024, according to government officials, UN agencies and independent research groups, threatening to deepen the already severe humanitarian crisis and trigger widespread displacement (REACH, June 2024). The production deficit remains in 2024, but it is below the deficit estimated for 2023 and the 2019–2023 average deficit (FAO, May 2024).


## DISPLACEMENT



Source: GRID 2024, May 2024; UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, May 2024.

 **IDPs** Since December 2013, conflict and instability have caused mass internal population displacement. In 2023, seasonal floods caused 167 000 new displacements, mainly in Central Equatoria, Jonglei and Unity states, adding to the aftermath of four consecutive years of flooding. Parts of Unity state, including Bentiu, which hosts the country's largest IDP camp, were largely submerged (IOM, December 2023). About 563 000 people were living in displacement as a result of natural disasters in 2023 (IDMC).

 **Returnees** The conflict in the Sudan prompted an estimated 572 000 refugees to return to South Sudan by the beginning of July 2024 (IOM & UNHCR, July 2024). Returnees face a critical food and nutrition crisis. Some 210 000 out of the 280 000 analysed by the IPC were projected to face IPC Phase 3 or above between April and July 2024, with 28 000 of them in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) (IPC, November 2023).

 **Refugees** South Sudan hosts 471 800 refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR Nowcasted estimates, May 2024), with 95 percent of them from the Sudan and 80 percent women and children (UNHCR, June 2024). Very High levels of wasting were observed in Gorom camp based on the 2023 UNHCR SENS survey. Overall, two-thirds of refugee households were either moderately or severely acutely food insecure based on a joint PDM exercise in September 2023. More than 85 percent lacked the economic resources to meet essential needs including food, and engaged in coping strategies that further undermined their precarious situation. Reduced food rations, maintained at 50 percent of the recommended 2 100 kilocalories, in 2023, aggravated the situation (UNHCR & WFP).

## ACUTE MALNUTRITION


### PEAK 2024 (APRIL–JUNE)


The nutrition situation was projected to worsen seasonally in 66 out of 80 analysed counties with Rubkona in Unity State experiencing the most severe decline and facing Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5). Additionally, 49 counties were in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4), and 17 in Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3). Conflict-affected Jonglei, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, Unity and Warrap are the worst-affected states.

### OVERVIEW


The nutrition situation has been deteriorating over the past years, with an increasing number of children acutely malnourished and the national GAM prevalence consistently above the 15 percent Very High threshold (FSNMSN and SMART, 2023). High food insecurity, poor quality and diversity of food, and high morbidity due to a weak health system, are the main contributing factors to acute malnutrition.

### DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

 **Inadequate services** Over 40 percent of the population has no access to improved drinking water and half of households in 56 counties report open defecation. Over half of children were ill with fever, cough and/or diarrhoea in the two weeks before the assessment. Displaced populations are especially vulnerable to malnutrition due to limited access to food, clean water, healthcare and other essential services. Seasonal floods add pressure to already strained health and nutrition services. This drives high levels of illness and is aggravated by limited funding for nutrition assistance that restricts support to areas with extreme needs (IPC, November 2023).

 **Inadequate practices** All Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) indicators remain suboptimal, with only 5 percent of children aged 6–23 months receiving a Minimum Acceptable Diet, considered Extremely Critical by IFE Core Group thresholds (IPC, November 2023).


### JULY 2023–JUNE 2024



 **0.9M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2023–2024.**


Source: IPC AMN, November 2023.

### PEAK 2024 (APRIL–JUNE)



Source: Kenya IPC TWG, November 2023.




 **Lack of food** Conflict-affected areas such as Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity and parts of Central Equatoria typically have higher rates of malnutrition due to food insecurity, displacement and limited access to humanitarian assistance. Besides conflict/insecurity, economic shocks and weather extremes, structural issues like poverty, low literacy rates, gender inequalities and limited agricultural productivity hinder households' ability to access nutritious foods.


## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Escalating conflict is leading to the collapse of humanitarian systems, destruction of markets and health facilities and disruption to agriculture, causing severe food shortages.

### JUNE–SEPTEMBER 2024

**25.6M** people or 54% of the total population were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.



This represented a further alarming deterioration since the corresponding 2023 lean season as the intensifying conflict displaced millions of people from their homes and disrupted markets, livelihoods, agriculture and humanitarian access.



Source: Sudan IPC TWG, July 2024.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

### ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY, 2016–2024

The Sudan has consistently faced a major food crisis since the first edition of the GRFC in 2017 and has been among the ten food crises with the largest number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in all but one edition of the report. Since 2020, the country has experienced a sharp deterioration in the food security situation, which has been exacerbated following the start of the conflict in April 2023.


In June 2024, the IPC assessed a risk of Famine in 14 areas (five localities and nine clusters of IDPs and refugees in Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, Al Jazirah states and some hotspots in Khartoum). In July 2024, the IPC Famine Review Committee found it plausible that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is ongoing in Zamzam IDP camp in North Darfur due to heightened hostilities and lack of humanitarian access and will continue at least to the end of October projection period.



The magnitude of the food crisis has nearly increased fivefold, from 4.4 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2016 to 9.6 million in 2020, reaching 20.3 million in 2023 and 25.6 million in 2024. In 2016, 12 percent of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. By 2024, over half of the population need urgent action to protect and/or save lives and livelihoods. More than three quarters of a million need urgent assistance to prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods (Catastrophe/IPC Phase 5).

Key drivers of food insecurity in the Sudan include conflict, economic instability, and weather extremes. The poverty rate was estimated at 66.1 percent in 2022 (African Development Bank Group, 2023), reflecting the significant macroeconomic challenges and widespread deprivation faced by a large portion of the population. The country ranked 172 out of 192 in the 2022 HDI rankings (UNDP). In mid-2024, it was one of 14 countries world wide considered 'Very High' risk on the INFORM index ranking (EC-JRC, 2024).


### Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024




Source: Sudan IPC TWG.

### PEAK 2023 (JULY–SEPTEMBER)

**20.3M** people or 42% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.



This marked a near two-fold increase since the 2022 peak, mainly driven by the start of the conflict in April 2023, which led to massive population movements and disrupted humanitarian access, markets, livelihoods, agriculture and basic services. Economic challenges and climatic shocks were contributing factors. IDPs, refugees, people in host communities, and those stranded in areas affected by direct fighting were the most affected (IPC, August 2023).



Source: Sudan IPC TWG, August 2023.



## DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS (2023–2024)


**Conflict/insecurity** Since April 2023, conflict has caused a massive loss of life, destruction of major infrastructure, disruption of basic services and severe disruption to livelihoods, humanitarian delivery and supply chains. Fighting in the main crop production areas during the peak of the harvest season severely reduced cereal production, estimated to be 46 percent lower than the previous year, with yield reductions up to 80 percent in Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur. In West Darfur, insecurity during the planting season led to complete crop failure (IPC, March 2024).

**Economic shocks** In the context of a protracted economic crisis, the Sudanese pound continued to depreciate in both the parallel and official markets while the severely disrupted financial sector resulted in inflation rates exceeding 300 percent by the end of 2023 (WFP, February 2024). Business operations, job opportunities and supply chains for international trade have been massively disrupted, amid a heightened need for food imports (IFPRI 2023; WFP and FAO, 2024) ().

Retail prices of domestically produced sorghum and millet reached new record highs in May 2024, with sorghum and millet prices more than doubling since March 2023 (FAO-GIEWS, July 2024). In rural areas, cereal prices increased faster than those for livestock, leading to deteriorating purchasing power for those selling livestock. Other typical sources of rural income, such as off-farm labour and the sale of bush products, livestock products, groundnuts and sesame, have been curtailed (FEWS NET, May 2024).

**Weather extremes** A 2023 rainy season characterized by dry spells and an erratic spatial and temporal distribution in south-eastern key crop-producing areas also affected yields and agricultural production (FAO, March 2024). Forecast above-average 2024 rains will likely provide favourable conditions for pasture regeneration and crop development but there is a major flood risk, increasing the risks of water-borne diseases for people, and the spread of pests and plant diseases for crops (IPC, June 2024).

## DISPLACEMENT



Source: IOM, June 2024; UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, May 2024.

**IDPs** Since the start of the conflict in mid-April 2023, around 7.9 million people have been displaced internally. Many have experienced secondary or tertiary displacement. As of July 2024, the country had a total of 10.7 million IDPs and was the largest internal displacement crisis globally (IOM DTM, July 2024). Khartoum is the main state of origin followed by South Darfur and North Darfur (IOM, June 2024). Additionally, an estimated 220 000 refugees self-relocated to other states in the Sudan (UNHCR).

At least 534 000 IDPs were expected to experience Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4) acute food insecurity between June and September 2024. Nine IDP and refugee clusters, across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan states, face an elevated risk of Famine during the same period if the conflict escalates further (IPC, June 2024). In July 2024, Famine was confirmed in Zamzam IDP camp (FRC, July 2024).

**Refugees** The number of refugees hosted in the Sudan has reduced from 1.1 million before the conflict to 0.9 million (UNHCR). Since 15 April 2023, close to 2.3 million people, including Sudanese citizens and refugees, have fled to neighbouring countries in search of safety and humanitarian assistance, mainly to South Sudan, Chad and Egypt (IOM, July 2024). These populations face dire conditions as they arrive in areas with limited resources, heightened food insecurity and growing challenges to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. With no resolution to the conflict in sight, amid limited resources and access for humanitarian actors, displacement in and out of the Sudan is projected to continue with a concomitant deepening of food insecurity and malnutrition (UNHCR, April 2024).

## ACUTE MALNUTRITION

Acute malnutrition was already among the most severe globally prior to the start of the conflict with a High national GAM prevalence of 13.6 percent for children under 5 years. In 40 percent of the country's localities, the prevalence exceeded the 15 percent Emergency threshold (HNO 2023, November 2022).

The situation has severely deteriorated since due to limited and disrupted access to health services, disease outbreaks, massive population displacement and worsening food and water security. In areas with limited access, a Nutrition Vulnerability Analysis indicates that in West Darfur, the drivers of acute malnutrition have reached Extremely Critical levels, while in Central and South Darfur, they have reached Critical levels. Although data are limited, the situation in the Greater Kordofan, Khartoum and Al Jazira points to a Critical situation (NVA, May 2024).

In May 2024, Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) mass screenings showed high levels of severe wasting, particularly in the Red Sea state.


## DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

The escalating conflict, displacement and weather hazards are adding to structural factors such as poverty, lack of education, gender inequalities, and limited agricultural productivity, which drive high vulnerability to malnutrition.

**Lack of food** Soaring food prices coupled with disrupted household food production and livelihoods are severely hindering food consumption. Food security conditions of displaced populations are increasingly dire (Sudan Nutrition Sector, April 2024).

**Inadequate services** According to WHO, about 70 percent of health facilities and more than two-thirds of main hospitals in conflict-affected areas are either non-functional or destroyed, with staff fleeing to safer areas. Those still functioning are in danger of closing due to shortages of medical staff, supplies, drinking water and electricity. Attacks on health facilities

## JULY 2023–JUNE 2024



**1.2M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2023–2024.**

Source: Sudan Nutrition Sector, April 2024.

are preventing patients and health staff from accessing hospitals (NVA, May 2024). Vaccination coverage has decreased by 50 percent and maternal, newborn and child health services by 60 percent. About 5 000 cases of measles and 11 000 suspected cases of cholera were reported in the country (Sudan Nutrition Sector, April 2024). More than one-third of acutely malnourished children face extreme and catastrophic conditions in WASH and health clusters, making them vulnerable to increased risks of illness and death.

**Inadequate practices** While over 62 percent of children under 6 months are exclusively breastfed, only 25.4 percent of children aged 6–23 months have an adequate dietary diversity for their age. Anaemia affects around 48 percent of children aged 6–59 months, classified as Severe by the WHO.


See Spotlight on the Sudan, pages 3–4.

## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Acute food insecurity deteriorated in the Karamoja region due to the impacts of a multi-season drought.


### JULY–SEPTEMBER 2024

 Up to **2.0M** people or 5% of the total population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

Though high carryover stocks from 2023 are expected to support food availability in the bimodal areas, widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in Karamoja due to impacts of a multi-season drought, including an early start to the lean season, and low household coping capacity. The most vulnerable households face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (FEWS NET, April 2024). In refugee settlements, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected as limited income and lack of cultivation restrict food access (FEWS NET, February 2024).



Source: FEWS NET, February 2024.

■ 1 - None/Minimal ■ 2 - Stressed ■ 3 - Crisis ■ 4 - Emergency ■ 5 - Catastrophe/Famine ■ Population analysed ■ Population not analysed ■ Total population  
 At least 25% of households meet 25–50% of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance

### ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY, 2018–2024


In all eight editions of the GRFC, Uganda has consistently been identified as a major food crisis, with over 1 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) each year. Differences in analysis coverage and data sources, however, challenge comparisons over time (FSIN et al, May 2023).

The highest number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above was recorded in 2022 due to consecutive seasons of below-average harvests coupled with high food prices. The analysis only covered food insecurity hotspots (Karamoja, urban areas, refugee populations and their host communities), accounting for 25 percent

of the population, while analyses during other years covered at least 87 percent of the population. In 2023, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity decreased to 1.8 million due to improved food access in bimodal areas following the 2022 second-season harvest that concluded in January 2023 (FEWS NET, February 2023).


The Karamoja region remains particularly vulnerable to extreme weather and conflict. Due to their limited access to livelihood opportunities and coping mechanisms, refugees also account for a considerable proportion of Uganda's food-insecure population.

### Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2018–2024



Source: FEWS NET.


### PEAK 2023 (APRIL–JUNE)

 Up to **1.8M** people or 4% of the population were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season was 22 percent lower than the June–August 2022 lean period of 2.3 million.

In Karamoja, most households faced Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with the worst affected in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) due to a fourth consecutive season of below-average harvests. Many refugees faced high levels of acute food insecurity due to elevated food prices, limited income and reduced humanitarian food assistance (FEWS NET, June 2023).

### DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS (2023–2024)

 **Weather extremes** Favourable harvests from the 2023 October–December rainfall season, and average rainfall during the 2024 March–May rainfall season are expected to improve food availability in most bimodal areas through September 2024, except in localized areas affected by deficits in March or floods in April and May (FEWS NET, April 2024). This follows erratic rains in the 2023 March–June season, which resulted in a poor harvest (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023), causing an early depletion of food stocks and increased market dependence.

In unimodal Karamoja, the 2024 lean season began early in January (FEWS NET, January 2024) following markedly below-average 2023 April–September rains resulting in poor crop production or total failures in hardest-hit areas, intensifying the impact of prior consecutive seasons of poor rainfall (FEWS NET, October 2023). Above-average main season rains are expected to support pasture and water availability for livestock, and near-average crop production later in 2024 (FEWS NET, April 2024).

**Conflict/insecurity** Persistent conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and the Sudan is expected to continue driving refugees into Uganda (FEWS NET, February 2024). Though the security situation in Karamoja is anticipated to improve slightly in 2024 (FEWS NET, February 2024), heightened cattle raids in 2023 resulted in significant livestock losses and reduced volume of trade. The fragility of the situation limited households' access to croplands and to safe grazing areas for herds in 2023 (IPC, June 2023).

**Economic shocks** Staple food prices seasonally increased between March and May 2024 as households depleted their food stocks, but were below 2023 levels due to carryover stocks and high regional supplies from United Republic of Tanzania (FEWS NET, May 2024).

Low staple food supply after consecutive poor harvests in certain parts, in tandem with sustained export demand, exerted upward pressure on staple food prices during the first half of 2023, reducing the purchasing power of many vulnerable households (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).

## DISPLACEMENT

**1.7M refugees and asylum-seekers as of May 2024.**

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, May 2024.


**Refugees** Uganda hosted 1.7 million refugees as of May 2024, the largest refugee population in the region, the majority fleeing conflict and instability in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 80 percent of them women and children. Close to 63 000 arrived since the start of the year, mostly from the Sudan. The majority of the refugee population (91 percent) is dispersed across 13 settlements and 9 percent reside in urban areas (UNHCR, May 2024).

Refugee conditions deteriorated in 2023 due to reduced humanitarian assistance and limited income-generating opportunities. With limited land availability, refugees were allocated increasingly smaller plots for cultivation, with new arrivals no longer receiving individual plots,

## ACUTE MALNUTRITION IN KARAMOJA, AND REFUGEES AND HOST DISTRICTS

**In 2024, the situation has deteriorated compared to 2023. Acute malnutrition levels increased in Karamoja, with two districts, Amudat and Kaabong, in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4). Area classification and burden for refugees and host districts remained unchanged.**

**KARAMOJA: MARCH 2024–FEBRUARY 2025;  
REFUGEES AND HOST DISTRICTS: APRIL 2023–MARCH 2024**



**22 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in 2024.**

Source: IPC AMN Karamoja, June 2024; IPC AMN Refugee settlements and host districts, November 2023.

constraining their food production (FEWS NET, June 2023). Following the implementation of the needs-based re-prioritisation of food assistance in July 2023, over 80 percent of those in settlements receive rations equivalent to only 30 percent of their minimum caloric needs (FEWS NET, February 2024). An increasing number have had to adopt negative coping strategies, including skipping meals, and reducing quantities consumed (UNHCR et al, March 2024).

Based on the 2023 Food Security and Nutrition Assessment (FSNA), only 48 percent of refugee households had an acceptable food consumption score, down from 55 percent in 2022 (UNHCR et al., 2024). The FSNA found an overall GAM prevalence of 7.2 percent (considered Medium) rising to 9.1 percent among refugees in West Nile. Rhino camp and Palabek settlements were classified in IPC AMN Phase 3 (Serious) with GAM prevalences of 10.5 percent and 13.9 percent respectively (UNHCR et al., 2024; IPC, November 2023).

The national GAM prevalence is Low, assessed in 2022 at 3.2 percent (UDHS, March 2024). However, high vulnerability has been recorded in Karamoja and among refugee and hosting districts. Poor dietary intake, high prevalence of diseases, disrupted access to markets and health services and high levels of acute food insecurity are the main contributing factors. Torrential rains during the 2024 rainy season are expected to exacerbate the risk of water-borne diseases in Karamoja.


## DRIVERS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION 2023–2024

**Inadequate practices** Time poverty and economic stress among Karamojong women underlie poor child-rearing practices. An average of 6 percent of children aged 6–23 months in Karamoja received a Minimum Acceptable Diet (MAD), which is considered an Extremely Critical prevalence by IFE Core Group thresholds. MAD prevalence in refugee settlements and host communities was considered Critical at 11 percent and 18 percent, respectively (IPC AMN, September 2023 and June 2024).

**Lack of food** Acute food insecurity led to poor diets for children and women in Karamoja, particularly in refugee settlements, as food assistance was cut due to limited resources. Anaemia levels averaged 50 percent in Karamoja and up to 45 percent in refugee and host districts, indicating a Severe public health issue.


**Inadequate services** Only 24 percent of households in Karamoja and 34 percent in refugee settlements access enough water for use and only 12 percent have access to improved sanitation services. Diarrhoea and malaria outbreaks continue to be high risk factors and are expected to worsen during the 2024 rainy season (IPC AMN, September 2023 and June 2024).

## KARAMOJA PEAK 2024 (MARCH–MAY)



Source: IPC AMN Karamoja, June 2024.

## REFUGEE AND HOST DISTRICTS PEAK 2023 (OCTOBER 2023–MARCH 2024)



Source: IPC AMN Refugee settlements and host districts, November 2023.





# Appendices

## Appendix 1

Trends graphs showing numbers of people by phase of acute food insecurity

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## Appendix 2

Acronyms and Glossary

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
Technical Notes

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Bibliography

# Trend graphs showing numbers of people by phase of acute food insecurity


Fig A.1 Numbers of people (in millions) in Kenya by phase of acute food insecurity, 2018–2024



Source: Kenya IPC TWG.


1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

Fig. A.2 Numbers of people (in millions) in Somalia by phase of acute food insecurity, 2017–2023



Source: Somalia IPC TWG.

Fig. A.3 Numbers of people (in millions) in South Sudan by phase of acute food insecurity, 2014–2024



Source: South Sudan IPC TWG.

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population



# Glossary

## **Acutely food-insecure people**

The number of people in Stressed or worse (IPC/CH Phase 2 or above) are considered “acutely” food insecure. Those in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) require urgent action to decrease food gaps and protect and save lives and livelihoods. This might not necessarily reflect the full population in need as some households may only be classified in IPC/CH Phase 1 or 2 because they receive assistance and need continued action. In many countries, the number in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) refers to populations in need of action further to that already taken.

## **Acute food insecurity**

Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food insecurity at a specific point in time that is of a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration.

These acute states are highly susceptible to change and can manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact the determinants of food insecurity and malnutrition (IPC, 2019). Transitory food insecurity is a short-term or temporary inability to meet food consumption requirements related to sporadic crises, indicating a capacity to recover.

## **Asylum-seekers**

Asylum-seeker is a general term for any person who is seeking international protection. In some countries, it is used as a legal term referring to a person who has applied for refugee status or a complementary international protection status and has not yet received a final decision on their claim. It can also refer to a person who has not yet submitted an application but may intend to do so, or may be in need of international protection. Not every asylum-seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum-seeker.

## **Chronic food insecurity**

Chronic food insecurity refers to food insecurity that persists over time, largely due to structural causes. The definition includes seasonal food insecurity that occurs during periods with non-exceptional conditions. Chronic food insecurity has relevance in providing strategic guidance to actions that focus on the medium-

and long-term improvement of the quality and quantity of food consumption for an active and healthy life (FAO et al., 2021). FAO defines this as “undernourishment” and it is the basis for SDG indicator 2.1.1 published in the SOFI report.

Moderate chronic food insecurity refers to the level of severity of food insecurity, based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), in which people face uncertainties about their ability to obtain food and have been forced to reduce, at times during the year, the quality and/or quantity of food they consume due to lack of money or other resources. It thus refers to a lack of consistent access to food, which diminishes dietary quality, disrupts normal eating patterns, and can have negative consequences for nutrition, health and wellbeing.

Severe food insecurity refers to the level of severity of food insecurity in which people have likely run out of food, experienced hunger and, at the most extreme, gone for days without eating, putting their health and well-being at grave risk, based on the FIES (FAO et al., 2021). According to the latest SOFI report, between 713 and 757 million people may have faced hunger in 2023 – or 122 million more people than in 2019, before the global pandemic. The prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity at the global level (SDG Indicator 2.1.2) remained unchanged for the second year in a row after increasing sharply from 2019 to 2020. In 2023, an estimated 28.9 percent of the global population – 2.33 billion people – were moderately or severely food insecure (SOFI, 2024).

## **Coping strategies**

Activities to which people resort in order to obtain food, income and/or other essential goods or services when their normal means of livelihood have been disrupted or other shocks/hazards affect their access to basic needs.

## **Export prohibitions and restrictions**

Measures that have a limiting effect on the quantity or amount of a product being exported. They can take the form of a tax or a quantitative restriction. The latter is generally prohibited with some exceptions, notably those applied to prevent or relieve critical shortage of foodstuffs.

## **Famine**

An IPC/CH area classification and is the highest phase of the IPC acute food insecurity scale. It suggests that starvation, death, destitution and Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition are or will likely be evident. A Famine classification is attributed when at least 20 percent of households in a given area face an extreme lack of food, at least 30 percent of children are suffering from acute malnutrition, and two people or four children for every 10 000 are dying each day due to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease (IPC, March 2024).

## **Food access**

Access by households/individuals to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet.

## **Food availability**

The availability of enough food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports.

## **Food crisis**

The GRFC defines a food crisis as a situation where acute food insecurity requires urgent action to protect and save lives and livelihoods at local or national levels and exceeds the local resources and capacities to respond. Food crises are more likely among populations already suffering from prolonged food insecurity and malnutrition, and in areas where structural factors increase their vulnerability to shocks. They can occur anywhere and can have global ramifications. For instance, the war in Ukraine also has food security impacts outside its own borders since the country is a major food exporter. Furthermore, the capacity of governments to respond can influence the magnitude and severity of food crises.

## **Food inflation**

Monthly food inflation, as measured by a price index, reflects the year-on-year percentage change in the cost of purchasing a basket of commonly consumed food items (WFP).

## **Food security**

This exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy

life (HLPE, 2020). For people to be food secure, food must be both consistently available and accessible in sufficient quantities and diversity, and households must be able to utilize (store, cook, prepare and share) the food in a way that has a positive nutritional impact.

### **Forced displacement**

Forced displacement is the movement of people who have been obliged to leave their homes, particularly to avoid the effects of armed conflict, generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters. Displacement is often a side-effect of conflict, food insecurity and weather shocks.

### **High levels of acute food insecurity**

This refers to populations in Crisis or worse (Phase 3 or above) according to the IPC/CH classification or moderate and severe acute food insecurity categories in CARI, and HNO/HRP food security People in Need (PiN) number as an approximation of IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. These are the populations who face high levels of acute food insecurity and are in need of urgent assistance.

### **Humanitarian, Development and Peace (HDP) Nexus**

Refers to the interlinking of efforts by humanitarian, development and peace actors. This approach advocates for improved coordination between actors and alignment around common goals to address crises, food security and overcome conflict.

### **INFORM**

The INFORM Risk Index is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters. It can support decisions about prevention, preparedness and response.

### **Internally displaced persons (IDPs)**

IDPs are those forced to flee their homes as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border.

### **International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (IRIS)**

Internationally agreed framework for countries and international organizations to improve production, coordination and dissemination of high-quality official statistics on IDPs that are consistent over time and comparable between regions and countries.

### **Lean season**

The period of the year when food access is most difficult and food prices are typically at their highest. It typically corresponds with a time of reduced food stores prior to harvest after the previous harvest has been exhausted. It occurs at different times of the year in different locations, depending on local climate conditions and agricultural practices.

### **Livelihoods**

People's capabilities, assets – both material and social – and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well-being and the policies and institutions that shape or constrain access to assets and choices about activities.

### **Magnitude**

Magnitude refers to the total number of people experiencing acute food insecurity in a reference population.

### **Major food crisis**

A food crisis is defined as “major” if more than 1 million people or more than 20 percent of the total country population is estimated to be facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent, or if at least one area is classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or above, or if the country is included in the IASC humanitarian system-wide emergency response level 3.

### **Malnutrition**

An umbrella term that covers undernutrition and overweight, obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes and cancer. See <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/malnutrition>.

In food-crisis countries/territories, this term usually refers to undernutrition. Undernutrition is a consequence of inadequate nutrient intake and/or absorption, and/or illness or disease. Acute malnutrition (wasting, thinness and/or bilateral pitting oedema), stunting, underweight (a composite of stunting and wasting) and micronutrient deficiencies (e.g. deficiencies in vitamin A, iron) are all forms of undernutrition.

Malnutrition has immediate and long-reaching consequences, including stunting children's growth, increasing susceptibility to disease and infections, and contributing to 45 percent of deaths among children under 5 years old (WHO). The determinants of malnutrition also include inadequate access to healthcare, poor

water and sanitation services, and inappropriate child-feeding and care practices, as described in the UNICEF framework.

### **Migrants**

According to IOM, “migrant” is an umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from their place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally defined, such as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students.

A migrant with the intention to settle is someone who has reached a final destination country, where they wish to remain permanently.

An in-transit migrant is someone who is temporarily staying in one or more countries with the objective of reaching a further and final destination country.

A pendular migrant is someone who regularly commutes or travels between their country of residence and another country, typically for work or economic reasons. These migrants often maintain a pattern of back-and-forth movement, crossing international borders frequently but without necessarily establishing permanent residence in the destination country.

### **Nutritional status**

The physiological state of an individual that results from the relationship between nutrient intake and requirements and the body's ability to digest, absorb and use these nutrients.

### **Nutritious foods**

Safe foods that contribute essential nutrients, including carbohydrates, lipids, vitamins, proteins (macronutrients) and minerals (micronutrients), fibre and other components to healthy diets that are beneficial for growth, and health and development, guarding against malnutrition.

### **Other people in need of international protection (OIPs)**

Other people in need of international protection refers to people who are outside their country or territory of origin, typically because they have been forcibly displaced across international borders, who have not been reported under other categories (asylum-seekers, refugees,

people in refugee-like situations) but who likely need international protection, including protection against forced return, as well as access to basic services on a temporary or longer-term basis. The terminology was first introduced in mid-2022 reporting by UNHCR.

### **Pastoralists**

Pastoralists are people whose primary means of livelihood involves raising livestock, such as cattle, sheep, goats, camels or yaks. These communities typically rely on animal husbandry as their main source of sustenance and often lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle, moving their herds seasonally in search of water and pasture.

### **Peak period/number**

The GRFC reports on the period with the highest number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the year in question as reported by endorsed sources. It does not necessarily reflect the latest analysis available, and it often, but not always, coincides with the lean season.

### **People in Need (PiN)**

People in Need, used in HNOs, is based on analysis that estimates who needs assistance, regardless of whether or not assistance is already provided. There are multisectoral and sectoral PiN. The GRFC only contains the sectoral PiN specific to people who are estimated to be highly acutely food insecure.

### **Prevalence**

Prevalence refers to the proportion or percentage of a population that exhibits a particular characteristic or condition at a specific point in time or over a specified period. In the context of food insecurity and/or malnutrition, prevalence indicates the extent of the food insecurity or wasting condition within a given country or population group. It is calculated by dividing the number of individuals with the characteristic or condition of interest by the total reference population, expressed as a percentage or a rate.

### **Primary driver**

Although acknowledging that drivers are often interlinked and mutually reinforcing, the GRFC identifies the primary driver as the most prominent trigger of acute food insecurity for each country/territory in terms of number of people affected. This term is used interchangeably with “most significant driver” in the GRFC.

### **Protracted food crisis**

A food crisis is defined as “protracted” if included as such in all eight editions of the GRFC. If the food crisis met the criteria to be defined as a “major” food crisis in all editions then it is defined as a “protracted major” food crisis.

### **Refugees**

Refugees are persons outside their countries of origin who are in need of international protection because of feared persecution, or a serious threat to their life, physical integrity or freedom in their country of origin as a result of persecution, armed conflict, violence or serious public disorder. The International Recommendation on Refugee Statistics provides a statistical definition of refugees.

### **Remittances**

The term refers to the transfer of money or resources by migrants to their families or communities in their countries of origin. These transfers are typically sent by migrants who have moved to another country for employment or other reasons, and they serve as an essential source of financial support for their families back home.

### **Resilience**

The capacity to absorb, prepare for, and prevent humanitarian disasters, crises and long-term stresses. It also contributes to the adaptation and transformation of livelihoods and food systems, progressing along a pathway out of the protracted crisis situation.

### **Stateless persons**

Someone who does not have a nationality. Some people are born stateless, but others become stateless due to a variety of reasons, including sovereign, legal, technical or administrative decisions or oversights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights underlines that “Everyone has the right to a nationality” (UNGA, 1948, article 15).

### **Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB)**

While the MEB is defined as the minimum amount of money that a household requires to meet their essential needs, on a regular or seasonal basis, at its average cost, the SMEB is the absolute minimum amount required to cover life-saving needs, which could involve the deprivation of certain rights as health or education. <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000074198/download/>

### **Transhumance**

Transhumance refers to the seasonal movement of people along with their livestock between fixed summer and winter pastures. This traditional practice is common in pastoral communities and is often driven by the need to find suitable grazing areas and water sources for livestock, which may vary with changing seasons.

### **Vulnerability**

Refers to the conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes that increase the susceptibility of an individual, community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards. Vulnerability to food insecurity is the range of conditions that increases the susceptibility of a household to the impact on food security in case of a shock or hazard.



# Indicators

## Access to basic drinking water services

Improved drinking water sources are those which, by nature of their design and construction, can deliver safe water. The WHO and UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply Sanitation and Hygiene subdivides the population using improved sources into three groups (safely managed, basic and limited) according to the level of service provided. To meet the criteria for a safely managed drinking water service, people must use an improved source meeting three criteria: accessible on premises; available when needed; and free from contamination. If the improved source does not meet any one of these criteria but a round trip to collect water takes 30 minutes or less, then it is classified as a basic drinking water service. If water collection from an improved source exceeds 30 minutes, it is categorized as a limited service (WHO and UNICEF).

## Annual population growth (WHO)

This expresses the ratio between the annual increase in the population size and the total population for that year, usually multiplied by 100. The annual increase in the population size is defined as a sum of differences: the difference between births less deaths and the difference between immigrants less emigrants, in a given country, territory or geographic area at a given year (WHO).

## Cereal import dependency weighted by caloric relevance

The indicator measures the nutritional significance of imported cereals in meeting the caloric needs of a population. This metric considers both the quantity of cereal imports and their caloric contribution to the overall diet. By weighting

cereal imports based on their caloric content, this measure provides a more nuanced understanding of a country's reliance on imported cereals for meeting dietary energy requirements. It helps assess the vulnerability of a population to fluctuations in cereal imports and highlights the importance of cereals in ensuring food security and nutrition (FAO).

## Crude Death Rate (CDR)

This indicator accounts for all the deaths that have occurred per day per 10 000 people over a given recall period (often 90 days) in an area or community. According to the IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis, the CDR should not include trauma-related deaths, but should include deaths due to unknown causes (IPC Technical Manual 3.1).

## Exclusive breastfeeding

Exclusive breastfeeding in the first 6 months followed by the timely introduction of safe and nutritionally adequate complementary foods with continued breastfeeding until 2 years of age or beyond ensures children receive all the nutrients they need. This indicator refers to the percentage of infants aged 0–5 months who were fed only breastmilk during the previous day.

Prevalence ranges	Label
> 70%	Phase 1 – Acceptable/minimal
50–70%	Phase 2 – Alert/stress
30–49.9%	Phase 3 – Serious/severe
11–29.9%	Phase 4 – Critical/extreme
< 10%	Phase 5 – Extremely critical/catastrophic

Source: adapted from UNICEF Breastfeeding Score Card.

## Food Consumption Score (FCS)

The FCS is a composite score based on households' dietary diversity, food consumption frequency, and the relative nutritional value of the different food groups, and it is considered a proxy of household food intake or caloric consumption. It is based on self-reported information about the household's consumption of eight standard food groups in the seven days prior to the survey.

The FCS is used to classify households based on standard thresholds into one of three food consumption groups: poor, borderline or acceptable food consumption.

## Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES)

Food insecurity as measured by the FIES refers to limited access to food, at the level of individuals or households, due to lack of money or other resources. The severity is measured using a set of eight questions asking respondents to self-report conditions and experiences typically associated with limited access to food. For purposes of the Acute Food Insecurity IPC classification, the questions are asked with reference to the 30 days preceding the survey (FAO).

## Food Expenditure Share (FES)

The FES is an indicator used to measure households' economic vulnerability. It determines the economic vulnerability without the need of having reference to a poverty line or minimum expenditure basket. The higher the share of households' consumption expenditure on food – out of the total consumption expenditure – the more vulnerable the households are to food insecurity. Each of the three modules must collect information on the value of purchases made in cash or on credit, as well as the value of consumed

items from in-kind assistance and in-kind gifts. The food submodule must also capture the value of consumed food from own production (WFP).

## Human Development Index (HDI) ranking (global)

A country's HDI value is determined by aggregating the country's scores in a vast assortment of indicators including life expectancy, literacy rate, rural populations' access to electricity, GDP per capita, exports and imports, homicide rate, multidimensional poverty index, income inequality, internet availability, and many more. These indicators are compiled into a single number between 0 and 1.0, with 1.0 being the highest possible human development. GRFC 2024 does not report the absolute value of the indicators but rather their ranking across all countries globally (UNDP).

## Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS)

The HDDS, developed by the Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project (FANTA) and promoted by FAO, aims to reflect the economic ability of a household to access a variety of foods, as a proxy of household access to food. It is based on the concept of household dietary diversity, or the number of different food groups over a reference period. It is measured based on the households' self-reported consumption of 12 food groups in the previous 24 hours (yesterday).

## Household Economy Analysis (HEA)

This is a livelihoods-based framework founded on the analysis of people in different social and economic circumstances. In particular, the HEA examines the self-reporting of information on: (i) how people access the food and cash they need; (ii) their assets, the opportunities available

to them, and the constraints they face; and (iii) the options open to them in times of crisis. Two thresholds define basic needs in the HEA: the Survival Threshold and the Livelihoods Protection Threshold. The HEA Survival Threshold represents the most basic needs, including minimum food energy requirements (calorie requirements), the costs associated with food preparation and consumption if associated inputs are purchased (such as salt, fuelwood or kerosene), and expenditure on water for human consumption (IPC Technical Manual 3.1).

### Household Hunger Scale (HHS)

The HHS is a household food deprivation scale that is based on household's self-reported perception-based information as to whether they have experienced problems of food insecurity in the past 30 days or 4 weeks. It is an indicator developed by the Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project to classify the severity of food insecurity during that period. The HHS consists of three standard questions regarding access to food and hunger in the household, and is followed by questions about the frequency of occurrence (rarely, sometimes and often). It is then classified into three household hunger categories: 0–1 = little to no hunger in the household; 2–3 = moderate hunger in the household; 4–6 = severe hunger in the household.

### GDP ranking

This refers to the GDP per capita at purchasing power parity expressed in USD. The total country GDP is divided by the mid-year population figure, where GDP is the total value of goods and services for final use produced by resident producers in an economy, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. In GRFC 2024, ranking of GDP in Asia, Latin America and Caribbean countries is relative to all the countries globally (WHO).

### INFORM Risk

INFORM summarises the multitude of factors contributing to the risk for humanitarian crises and disasters into a single index. It combines 54 indicators into 3 dimensions of risk:

**hazards** (events that could occur) and exposure to them;

**vulnerability** (the susceptibility of communities to those hazards);

**lack of coping capacity** (lack of resources that can alleviate the impact).

The results give an overall risk score out of 10 for each country, and for each of the dimensions, categories and components of risk (EC-JRC).

### Livelihood Coping Strategies (LCS)

This indicator is used to better understand the longer-term coping capacity of households. LCS measures the most severe livelihood coping strategy applied by the household during the 30 days prior to the interview, or that has been exhausted by the household within the 12 months prior to the interview, in response to a lack of food or money to buy food. The module includes at least ten coping strategies (four stress strategies, three crisis strategies and three emergency strategies), contextualized to the country context, based on the master list. LCS classifies households into four categories (no coping strategies, stress coping, crisis or emergency coping) based on the highest level of severity applied.

### Minimum Acceptable Diet

This composite indicator combines meal frequency and dietary diversity to assess the proportion of children aged 6–23 months consuming a diet that meets the minimum requirements for growth and development.

Prevalence ranges	Label
> 70%	Phase 1 – Acceptable/minimal
40–70%	Phase 2 – Alert/stress
20–39.9%	Phase 3 – Serious/severe
10–19.9%	Phase 4 – Critical/extreme
< 10%	Phase 5 – Extremely critical/catastrophic

Source: Preliminary thresholds suggested by IFE Core Group.

### Minimum Dietary Diversity

This indicator refers to the percentage of children aged 6–23 months who receive foods from five or more out of eight food groups a day. The eight food groups are: (i) breastmilk; (ii) grains, roots and tubers; (iii) legumes and nuts; (iv) dairy products (infant formula, milk, yoghurt, cheese); (v) flesh foods (meat, fish, poultry and liver/organ meats); (vi) eggs; (vii) vitamin A-rich fruits and vegetables; (viii) other fruits and vegetables. In some surveys, Minimum Dietary Diversity is calculated based on seven food groups, excluding breastmilk. In these cases, the indicator refers to the percentage of children aged 6–23 months who receive foods from four or more out of seven food groups a day (UNICEF).

### Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB)

An MEB is defined as what a household requires to meet basic needs, on a regular or seasonal basis, and its average cost. It is a monetary threshold – the cost of these goods, utilities, services and resources – and is conceptually equivalent to a poverty line. It typically describes the cost of meeting one month's worth of essential needs. Since the MEB sets a monetary threshold for what is needed to cover essential needs, households

whose expenditures fall below the MEB are defined as being unable to meet their essential needs. More information is available (WFP).

### Minimum Meal Frequency

The indicator refers to the proportion of children aged 6–23 months who receive solid, semi-solid or soft foods at least the minimum number of recommended times a day depending on their age and whether they are breastfed (WHO).

### Percentage of crop and rangelands growing period affected by drought conditions

The percentage of crop or rangeland growing period affected by drought conditions indicates how often drought warnings were triggered by the HotSpots of Agricultural Production (ASAP) early warning system based on Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) observations between 2003 and 2023 for crops or rangeland. NDVI is a measure of plant health and biomass. Drought warnings are calculated specifically for cropland and rangelands during their respective growing seasons. Warnings are only issued when significant negative NDVI anomalies are detected across large areas (more than 25 percent of the total active cropland or rangelands). This ensures the anomalies are linked to large-scale droughts, not localized events. Higher percentages in these metrics suggest a country has experienced more frequent large-scale declines in biomass, potentially indicating a greater risk of drought impacting crops or rangeland (EC-JRC, ASAP).

### Percentage of households not consuming micronutrient-rich food (analysed in refugee populations)

This refers to the proportion of households with no member consuming any vegetables, fruits, meat, eggs, fish/seafood, or milk/milk products over a reference period of 24 hours (FAO).

### Prevalence of anaemia

This indicator refers to the proportion of children aged 6–59 months and of reproductive age women (15–49 years) who are anaemic. Anaemia is a condition in which the number of red blood cells or their oxygen-carrying capacity is insufficient to meet physiological needs, which varies by age, sex, altitude, smoking and pregnancy status. Iron deficiency is thought to be the most common cause of anaemia globally, although other conditions, such as folate, vitamin B12 and vitamin A deficiencies, chronic inflammation, parasitic infections and inherited disorders can all cause anaemia. In its severe form, it is associated with fatigue, weakness, dizziness and drowsiness.

Pregnant women and children are particularly vulnerable (WHO).

Prevalence ranges	Label
< 5.0%	No public health problem
5.0–19.9%	Mild public health problem
20.0–39.9%	Moderate public health problem
≥ 40.0%	Severe public health problem

Source: WHO, 2008.

### Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment

The indicator refers to the proportion of the total employed population engaged in agricultural, forestry and fishery activities within a country or region. This indicator is typically expressed as a percentage and provides insights into the significance of these primary sectors in the overall labour force of an economy (FAO).

### Stunting

Low height-for-age is the result of chronic or recurrent undernutrition, usually associated with poverty, poor maternal health and nutrition, frequent illness and/or inappropriate feeding and care in early life. Stunting prevents children from reaching their physical and cognitive potential (UNICEF).

### Under-5 death rate (U5DR)

This refers to all deaths per day of children aged under 5 (up to 59 months) per 10 000 children over a given recall period (often 90 days) in an area or community. The U5DR is typically around twice that of the CDR (IPC Technical Manual 3.1).

### Wasting

Low weight-for-height often indicates recent and severe weight loss, although it can also persist for a long time. It usually occurs when a person has not had food of adequate quality and quantity and/or they have had frequent or prolonged illnesses. Wasting in children is associated with a higher risk of death if not treated properly. In this report it is used as a synonym for acute malnutrition (UNICEF).



# Technical notes

FIG. TN.1 Overview of the process of production and publication of the Global Report on Food Crises



All partners are in agreement with the approximate degree of magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity indicated for the countries included in this report except where a disclaimer is present. The differences stem from the varying interpretations of the data related to the factors which contribute to or indicate acute food insecurity.

## 1 | PRELIMINARY WORK

### Technical consultations

Technical consultations held with the Senior Committee at the beginning of the reporting cycle aimed to:

- Reaffirm the partner organisations' engagement and responsibilities
- Confirm the scope of the report
- Provide initial guidance
- Endorse country selection criteria
- Agree on criteria for endorsement of data/analysis
- Agree on date of release and report workplan.

### Selection of food-crisis countries/territories

FSIN and the Food Security Technical Working Group (TWG) led this process. The list of countries/territories and the selection rationale was then presented to the Senior Committee for endorsement.

The process was continuous throughout 2023 and finished on 31 December to ensure inclusiveness. During the year the following were identified:

- Countries/territories that requested external assistance for food and/or faced shocks as assessed by the FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) in 2023. FAO-GIEWS classifies and regularly updates the list of countries requiring external assistance for food, dividing them into three categories: (1) countries with an exceptional shortfall in

aggregate food production and supplies; (2) countries with widespread lack of access to food; and (3) countries with severe localized food insecurity. External assistance for logistical support, for capacity building, for longer-term poverty reduction or development purposes is not considered as a qualifying factor for a food crisis.

- Countries/territories that had a Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) in 2023
- Countries/territories considered low or lower/upper-middle-income that had not been identified by FAO-GIEWS assessments and that did not have an HRP, but requested external food assistance because of:
  - having populations affected by conflict/insecurity, weather extremes and/or economic shocks.

- hosting refugee populations who were assisted by UNHCR and WFP.
- having over 1 million or at least 20 percent of its population forcibly displaced.

For countries hosting assisted refugee populations, only the *refugee populations* were selected. The host country was only selected if its *resident population* needed external food assistance.

Countries were excluded if none of the above criteria were met, even if acute food insecurity data were available, e.g. Ghana in 2023, or Côte d'Ivoire in 2022, or if they were high-income countries (according to the World Bank definition).

**73** countries/territories identified as food crises in 2023 as a result of this process.

## 73 countries/territories selected for the GRFC 2024, by criterion

### GIIEWS list

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

### Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)

Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.

### Emergency external assistance in response to a shock

Angola, Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nicaragua, Peru, Tajikistan, Togo, Türkiye and Vanuatu.

### Emergency external assistance in response to hosting refugees

Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Moldova and Rwanda.

## 2 | RESEARCH, ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION

### Data endorsement

#### FSIN and Technical Working Groups:

- Validate the reliability/relevance of the data source and methodology
- Identify and endorse peak acute food insecurity estimates for 2023
- Identify and endorse peak acute food insecurity projections for 2024
- Identify and endorse malnutrition data
- Identify and endorse displacement data
- Identify and endorse key drivers of acute food insecurity.

### ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY DATA

**FSIN facilitated discussion with the Food Security TWG on the available acute food insecurity data for the selected countries/territories.**

Data gathered must follow partnership criteria and requirements. The TWG evaluated the following before final endorsement:

**Methodology** Did the acute food insecurity assessment/analysis provide an estimate or a projection of acute food insecurity. Did the methodology quantifying acute food insecurity levels provide an equivalence or approximation of IPC Phase 3 or above (see data endorsement).

**Timeframe** Did the acute food insecurity assessment/analysis cover at least one month of 2023 and did the projection analysis cover at least one month of 2024. If no data were available for 2023, the TWG discussed the relevance and appropriateness of using data referring to Q3/Q4 of 2022.

### Coverage

Whether the acute food insecurity assessment/analysis covered the whole country/territory. If not, the Food Security TWG discussed whether for certain countries/territories limited geographical analysis was appropriate and acceptable.

### Consensus and participation

Whether the acute food insecurity assessment/analysis was based on multi-stakeholder technical consensus and/or a convergence of evidence and/or based on data collection by a trusted actor and/or endorsed at country level by the national stakeholders.

**59** of the 73 countries/territories identified as food crises had **data available that met the technical requirements** to be included in the GRFC 2024. Out of the 73 countries/territories identified as food crises, **14 did not have data or did not meet the GRFC technical requirements.** Available information is however included in the regional sections.


### Data sources and methodologies

The preferred source of data for acute food insecurity is the IPC/CH. If unavailable, the Technical Working Groups evaluate the use of other sources of evidence. These include:

- FEWS NET analyses which are IPC-compatible;
- WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators (CARI);
- food insecurity PiN of the Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNOS).

Although these alternative sources do not provide comparable disaggregation into Phases 3, 4 and 5, their estimates are reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).

**FIG. TN.2 Population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023, by methodology**



Source: FSIN, GRFC 2024.

The endorsement of the data gathered in most cases took the following priority ranking:

### Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

The IPC results from a partnership of various organizations at the global, regional and country levels and is widely accepted by the international community as a global reference for the classification of acute food insecurity.

There are around 30 countries currently implementing the IPC. It provides the 'big picture' evidence base of food crises by assessing the following: how severe, how many, when, where, why, who, as well as the key characteristics of the food crisis. It provides data for two time periods – the current situation and a projection. This information helps governments, humanitarian actors and other decision-makers quickly understand a crisis (or potential crisis) and informs appropriate action.

The IPC makes the best use of the evidence available through a transparent, traceable and rigorous process. Evidence requirements to complete classification have been developed, considering the range of circumstances in which

FIG. TN.3 IPC 3.1 acute food insecurity reference table

Phase name and description		Phase 1 None/Minimal	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Catastrophe/Famine	
		Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Households either have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	Households either have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine Classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)	
Priority response objectives		Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction	Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods	Urgent action required to 			
				Protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps	Save lives and livelihoods	Revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods	
Food security first-level outcomes	First-level outcomes refer to characteristics of food consumption and livelihood change. Thresholds that correspond as closely as possible to the Phase descriptions are included for each indicator. Although cut-offs are based on applied research and presented as global reference, correlation between indicators is often somewhat limited and findings need to be contextualized. The area is classified in the most severe Phase that affects at least 20% of the population.						
	Food consumption (focus on energy intake)	Quantity: Adequate energy intake Dietary energy intake: Adequate (avg. 2 350 kcal pp/day) and stable Household Dietary Diversity Score: 5–12 food groups and stable Food Consumption Score: Acceptable and stable Household Hunger Scale: 0 (none) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: 0–3 Household Economy Analysis: No livelihood protection deficit Food Insecurity Experience Scale: (FIES 30 days recall):<0.58	Quantity: Minimally Adequate Dietary energy intake: Minimally adequate (avg. 2 100 kcal pp/day) Household Dietary Diversity Score: 5-FG but deterioration ≥1 FG from typical Food Consumption Score: Acceptable but deterioration from typical Household Hunger Scale: 1 (slight) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: 4–18 Household Economy Analysis: Small or moderate livelihood protection deficit <80% FIES: Between -0.58 and 0.36	Quantity: Moderately Inadequate – Moderate deficits Dietary energy intake: Food gap (below avg. 2 100 kcal pp/day) Household Dietary Diversity Score: 3–4 FG Food Consumption Score: Borderline Household Hunger Scale: 2–3 (moderate) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: ≥19 (non-defining characteristics (NDC) to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) Household Economy Analysis: Livelihood protection deficit ≥80%; or survival deficit <20% FIES: > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)	Quantity: Very Inadequate – Large deficits Dietary energy intake: Large food gap; well below 2 100 kcal pp/day Household Dietary Diversity Score: 0–2 FG (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) Food Consumption Score: Poor (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) Household Hunger Scale: 4 (severe) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: ≥19 (NDC to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) Household Economy Analysis: Survival deficit ≥20% but <50% FIES: > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)	Quantity: Extremely Inadequate – Very large deficits Dietary energy intake: Extreme food gap Household Dietary Diversity Score: 0–2 FG Food Consumption Score: Poor (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) Household Hunger Scale: 5–6 (severe) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: ≥19 (NDC to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) Household Economy Analysis: Survival deficit ≥50% FIES: > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)	
	Livelihood change (assets and strategies)	Livelihood change: Sustainable livelihood strategies and assets Livelihood coping strategies: No stress, crisis or emergency coping observed	Livelihood change: Stressed strategies and/or assets; reduced ability to invest in livelihoods Livelihood coping strategies: Stress strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	Livelihood change: Accelerated depletion/erosion of strategies and/or assets Livelihood coping strategies: Crisis strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	Livelihood change: Extreme depletion/liquidation of strategies and assets Livelihood coping strategies: Emergency strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	Livelihood change: Near complete collapse of strategies and assets Livelihood coping strategies: Near exhaustion of coping capacity	
Food security second-level outcomes	Second-level outcomes refer to area-level estimations of nutritional status and mortality that are especially useful for identification of more severe phases when food gaps are expected to impact malnutrition and mortality. For both nutrition and mortality area outcomes, household food consumption deficits should be an explanatory factor in order for that evidence to be used in support of the classification.						
	Nutritional status*	Global Acute Malnutrition based on Weight-for-Height Z-score	Acceptable <5%	Alert 5–9.9%	Serious 10–14.9% or > than usual	Critical 15–29.9% or > much greater than average	Extremely Critical ≥30%
		Global Acute Malnutrition based on Mid-Upper Arm Circumference	<5%	5–9.9%	10–14.9%	≥15%	
		Body Mass Index <18.5	<5%	5–9.9%	10–19.9%, 1.5 x greater than baseline	20–39.9%	≥40%
	Mortality*	Crude Death Rate <0.5/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate <1/10,000/day	Crude Death Rate <0.5/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate <1/10,000/day	Crude Death Rate 0.5–0.99/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate 1–2/10 000/day	Crude Death Rate 1–1.99/10,000/day or <2x reference Under-five Death Rate 2–3.99/10,000/day	Crude Death Rate ≥2/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate ≥4/10,000/day	
Food security contributing factors	For contributing factors, specific indicators and thresholds for different phases need to be determined and analysed according to the livelihood context; nevertheless, general descriptions for contributing factors are provided below.						
	Food availability, access, utilization, and stability	Adequate to meet short-term food consumption requirements Safe water ≥15 litres pp/day	Borderline adequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water marginally ≥15 litres pp/day	Inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water >7.5 to 15 litres pp/day	Very inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water >3 to <7.5 litres pp/day	Extremely inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water ≤3 litres pp/day	
	Hazards and vulnerability	None or minimal effects of hazards and vulnerability on livelihoods and food consumption	Effects of hazards and vulnerability stress livelihoods and food consumption	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in loss of assets and/or significant food consumption deficits	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in large loss of livelihood assets and/or extreme food consumption deficits	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in near complete collapse of livelihood assets and/or near complete food consumption deficits	



evidence quality and quantity may be limited while ensuring adherence to minimum standards.

To ensure the application of the IPC in settings where access for collecting evidence is limited, specialized parameters have been developed. The IPC provides a structured process for making the best assessment of the situation based on what is known and shows the limitations of its classifications as part of the process.

IPC analysis teams consolidate and analyse complex evidence from different methods and sources (e.g. food prices, seasonal calendars, rainfall, food-security assessments, etc.), but the IPC allows them to describe their conclusions using consistent language and standards and in a simple and accessible form. This harmonized approach is particularly useful in comparing situations across countries and regions, and over time.

The IPC technical manual version 3.1 provides information to understand and critically utilize IPC products and the protocols, including tools and procedures, to conduct the classification itself. See <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/resources/ipc-manual/en/>

### **Classifying Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)**

Famine is classified at area level in the IPC according to an internationally accepted standard based on the following three criteria:

- At least 1 in 5 households face an extreme lack of food.
- At least 30 percent of children suffer from wasting.
- At least two people for every 10 000 or four children under five years old for every 10 000 are dying each day due to outright starvation or the interaction of malnutrition and disease.

Given the severity and implications of this classification, all regular IPC protocols and special

Famine protocols must be met before an area is classified in Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). See IPC version 3.1.

Areas can be classified in Famine Likely if minimally adequate evidence available indicates that a Famine may be occurring or will occur. This classification should trigger prompt action by decision-makers to address the situation while calling for urgent efforts to collect more evidence.

Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe, the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement.

The IPC supports Famine prevention by highlighting the following:

- IPC Phase 4 Emergency is an extremely severe situation where urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods.
- Households can be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if areas are not classified in Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). This is the case when less than 20 percent of the population is experiencing Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) conditions and/or when malnutrition and/or mortality levels have not (or not yet) reached Famine thresholds. These households experience the same severity of conditions even if the area is not yet classified in Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). This can occur due to the time lag between food insecurity, malnutrition and mortality, or in the case of a localized situation.
- Projections of Famine can be made even if the areas are not currently classified in Famine, thus allowing early warning.

Risk of Famine is an IPC statement that highlights the potential deterioration of the situation compared with the most-likely scenario expected during the projection period. Although it is not an IPC classification, it indicates a worst-case scenario that has a reasonable probability of occurring.

### **Cadre Harmonisé (CH)**

The Cadre Harmonisé is the multi-dimensional analytical framework used by CILSS for the analysis and identification of areas and groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon.

It aims to inform national and regional food-crisis prevention and management systems. It considers various indicators of food and nutrition security outcomes and contributing factors.

The CH relies on existing food security and nutrition information systems that have been in place in most Sahelian countries since 1985, and more recently in other coastal countries of West Africa.

There are 18 countries currently implementing the CH: Burkina Faso, Benin, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

The CH manual version 2.0 clarifies the specific functions and protocols for carrying out an integrated and consensual analysis of acute food and nutrition insecurity.

See <http://www.cilss.int/index.php/2019/10/04/cadre-harmonise-manuel-version-2-0/>

### **IPC/CH five-phase classification**

As a result of technical developments of the CH tools and processes and harmonization efforts carried out over the last decade, the IPC and the CH acute food insecurity approaches are very close to each other and give comparable figures of acute food insecurity.

The five-phase classification is the same though there are a few differences pertaining to the use of certain indicators, classification of Famine and estimation of humanitarian assistance.

Classification into five phases (1) None/Minimal, (2) Stressed, (3) Crisis, (4) Emergency, (5)

Catastrophe/Famine is based on a convergence of available evidence, including indicators related to food consumption, livelihoods, malnutrition and mortality. Each phase has important and distinct implications for where and how best to intervene and thus influences priority response objectives. Populations in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) are deemed to be those in need of urgent food, livelihood and nutrition assistance. Populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) require a distinct set of actions – ideally disaster risk reduction and livelihood protection interventions.

### **FEWS NET**

The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) classification is IPC-compatible, which means it follows key IPC protocols but is not built on multi-partner technical consensus, so it does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners.

Funded and managed by USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), FEWS NET provides early warning and evidence-based analysis of acute food insecurity to inform humanitarian and development response. FEWS NET monitors 30 countries, 22 in presence and eight remotely, where it analyses the dynamics of food, nutrition and livelihood security so policymakers can design programmes that address the root causes of persistent or recurrent acute food insecurity, undernutrition and vulnerability.

### **CARI**

WFP has developed, and uses, the Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) methodology. This methodology is also commonly used by other food security partners in their assessments. CARI is a widespread practice for Multi-Sector Needs Assessments, used in calculating the People in Need figure for countries/territories not covered by IPC/CH analyses.

Before any intervention, WFP analyses the food

security situation with partners to perform effective targeting, determines the most appropriate type and scale of intervention and ensures the most efficient use of humanitarian resources.

The CARI addresses the multiple dimensions of food security through five indicators – Food Consumption Score, reduced Coping Strategies Index, Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs (ECMEN) OR Food Expenditure Share, and Livelihood Coping Strategies.

Each surveyed household is classified into one of four food security categories – food secure, marginally food secure, moderately acutely food insecure and severely acutely food insecure. The results are presented within the CARI food security console, which provides the prevalence of each available CARI food security indicator. The aggregate results provide the population's overall food security outcome or Food Security Index (FSI).

Populations that are classified as 'moderately acute food insecure' and 'severely acute food insecure' as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. In this year's edition, for upper-middle-income countries with WFP CARI analyses only, resident populations classified as "severely food insecure" have been considered.

The indicators included within the CARI approach can be used within IPC/CH analyses, but there are many differences between the two methods. The fundamental difference is that the CARI analyses primary data from a single household survey, while the IPC/CH uses a 'convergence-of-evidence' approach, incorporating and analysing a variety of secondary information. While the CARI assesses the situation at a fixed point in time with no projection, the IPC/CH provides the current snapshot and a projection based on the most likely scenario for any period in the future.

FIG. TN.4 Number of countries by data sources for the 2023 peak estimates and 2023 projection estimates

Data sources	Methodology	2023*	2024
IPC	IPC/CH five phase classification	24	21
CH	IPC/CH five phase classification	14	13
FEWS NET	In-country presence	4	4
	Remote Monitoring	2	2
WFP	CARI	9	
FAO/WFP	CARI	1	
REACH	CARI	1	
HNO	CARI	1	
HNO/HNRP	Other accepted food security analysis methodology at country level	4	1

\* There are 59 countries/territories with data available and endorsed in 2023, but the Palestine assessment consists of different sources for West Bank and the Gaza Strip, each following a different methodology, so the numbers in this column add up to 60.

### Change in CARI methodology

The third edition of CARI, launched in December 2021, introduced two changes. First, the food consumption domain included a reduced Coping Strategies Index in addition to Food Consumption Group.

Secondly, Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs (ECMEN) became the preferred measure for economic vulnerability instead of food expenditure share. This is better for assistance targeting purposes. The main implication for the use in GRFC is the comparison of the CARI findings with prior surveys.

The ECMEN indicator identifies the percentage of households whose expenditures exceed the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB). A MEB is defined as what a household requires in order to meet their essential needs, on a regular or seasonal basis, and its cost.

The MEB covers those needs that households meet fully or partially through the market. It serves

as a monetary threshold that can be used to assess a household's economic capacity to meet their needs. To compute the ECMEN, household expenditures are used as a proxy for household economic capacity.

See CARI methodology <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000134704/download/>

### Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and other estimates

OCHA HNOs provide the People in Need (PiN) figure for the Food Security and Livelihoods cluster, based on data collected during the year and it is endorsed by the Humanitarian Country Team in each country/territory.

Similarly, food insecurity estimates are provided by OCHA in the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and Joint Response Plan (JRP). When no other sources for acute food insecurity estimates are available, the GRFC food security TWG assesses the methodology of the PiN to ensure it is based on acute food insecurity indicators and used

as an approximation to Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) for use in the GRFC. Exceptions can be made based on the Food Security TWG discussion and agreement on the data that appear to best reflect a particular country's food security situation.

In cases where there was no consensus within the TWG, the ultimate decision over country inclusion and what data to use in the report is deferred to the Senior Committee.

**All partners agree with the approximate degree of magnitude and severity** of acute food insecurity indicated for the countries/territories included in this report.

### Data not meeting GRFC technical requirements and data gaps

As a result of this rigorous process, there are countries where food security information is available, but the source does not use the methods endorsed by the GRFC Food Security TWG. The information is acknowledged but not included until further studies on its comparability with the other methodologies used mean it can be endorsed as equivalent/approximate to IPC Phase 3 and above. This is the case, for instance, for estimates acquired through remote data collection. The Senior Committee validates these data for inclusion in the report.

Such countries are listed in the GRFC as '**data not meeting GRFC technical requirements**' and reported at the end of each regional section.

If no public analysis for the year in question is available, the country/territory selected for inclusion in the GRFC is a **data gap**.

### Acute food insecurity peak for 2023

Among data available for a given country/territory that have been endorsed for 2023 and validated by the TWG according to the criteria listed above, the analysis/assessment reporting the highest number

of acutely food-insecure people is selected as the peak. It does not necessarily reflect the latest analysis available.

The **peak** can be either an analysis made for the current period in 2023 or a projection made in 2022 or 2023 and referring to a period of the year 2023. If none of the above are available, an analysis covering Q3/Q4 of 2022 can be used as peak, if considered still relevant by the Food Security TWG.

The **peak projection** is based on the highest number of people facing high levels of acute food-insecurity in 2023, as reported by endorsed data sources available as of January 2024.

For this GRFC 2024 report, the cut-off date for data inclusion was 7 January 2024 so the projection estimates only partially cover 2024.

Analyses that straddle 2023 and 2024 are considered for both years and, if reporting the highest number of people compared to other available analyses in the two years, the same analysis is used as the peak for both 2023 and 2024.

A projection update or a new analysis covering at least part of the previous projection period overrides the original projection findings since it is based on more up-to-date information, hence providing more accurate findings.

Data from non-IPC/CH (FEWS NET, CARI and HNO analyses) sources are presented in the country narratives according to their specific terminology and categorization.

The wording 'high levels of acute food insecurity' or 'IPC/CH Phase 3 or above, or equivalent' are used to include both IPC/CH estimates and any food security estimates that are based on non-IPC/CH data sources reflecting an approximation of IPC Phase 3 and above. Information is presented in summary tables as IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent without further breakdown to more specific IPC/CH Phases.

FIG. TN.5 The IPC Acute Malnutrition Scale

Phase name and description	Phase 1 Acceptable	Phase 2 Alert	Phase 3 Serious	Phase 4 Critical	Phase 5 Extremely Critical
	Less than 5% of children are acutely malnourished.	5-9.9% of children are acutely malnourished..	10-14.9% of children are acutely malnourished.	15-29.9% of children are acutely malnourished. The mortality and morbidity levels are elevated or increasing. Individual food consumption is likely to be compromised.	30% or more children are acutely malnourished. Widespread morbidity and/or very large individual food consumption gaps are likely evident.
	The situation is progressively deteriorating, with increasing levels of acute malnutrition. Morbidity levels and/or individual food consumption gaps are likely to increase with increasing levels of acute malnutrition.				
Priority response objective to decrease acute malnutrition and to prevent related mortality. <sup>2</sup>	Maintain the low prevalence of acute malnutrition.	Strengthen existing response capacity and resilience. Address contributing factors to acute malnutrition. Monitor conditions and plan response as required.	Urgently reduce acute malnutrition levels through →		
			Scaling up of treatment and prevention of affected populations.	Significant scale-up and intensification of treatment and protection activities to reach additional population affected.	Addressing widespread acute malnutrition and disease epidemics by all means.
Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) based on weight for height Z-score (WHZ)	<5%	5.0 to 9.9%	10.0 to 14.9%	15.0 to 29.9%	≥30%
Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) based on mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC)	<5%				
	5-9.9%				
			10-14.9%		
			≥15%		
*GAM based on MUAC must only be used in the absence of GAM based on WHZ; the final IPC Acute Malnutrition phase with GAM based on MUAC should be supported by an analysis of the relationship between WHZ and MUAC in the area of analysis and also by using convergence of evidence with contributing factors. In exceptional conditions where GAM based on MUAC is significantly higher than GAM based on WHZ (i.e. two or more phases), both GAM based on WHZ, and GAM based on MUAC should be considered, and the final phase should be determined with convergence of evidence.					



## Major food crises

A country/territory is defined as a major food crisis when its acute food insecurity estimates meet one or more of the following criteria:

- At least 20 percent of the country population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent
- At least 1 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent
- Any area classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or above.
- Included in the IASC humanitarian system-wide emergency response-level 3.

**44** countries/territories were identified as **major food crises** in 2023.

## Protracted food crises

A country/territory is defined as a protracted food crisis when it is included in all editions of the GRFC.

Any country/territory included in all GRFC editions and consistently identified as a major food crisis is then defined as a protracted major food crisis.

**36** countries/territories were identified as **protracted food crises** in 2023, **19** of them as **protracted major food crises**.

## NUTRITION DATA

**FSIN facilitated discussions with the Nutrition TWG on the available malnutrition data for the selected countries/territories.**

Data gathered must follow the partnership criteria and requirements. The Nutrition TWG evaluated the analyses and indicators available

for the reporting year, i.e. 2023 in the case of the GRFC 2024. If no data were available for 2023, the Nutrition TWG discussed the relevance and appropriateness of using data from 2021 and 2022. Projections for 2024 were considered if the analysis covered at least one month of 2024.

Data were screened for all 73 countries/territories selected but, for internal consistency, they were aggregated and reported at global and regional level for only the 59 countries/territories that had acute food insecurity data meeting the GRFC technical requirements.

**35** out of the 59 food-crisis countries/territories in the GRFC 2024 had data available on acute malnutrition that **met the technical requirements** to be included in the GRFC 2024.

## Data sources and methodologies


The inclusion in the GRFC of data regarding the burden of malnutrition, which covers the number of children under 5 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women between 15 and 49 years of age suffering from acute malnutrition during a specific period, adheres to a prioritized list of data sources as follows:

1. IPC Acute Malnutrition analyses
2. Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNO), or Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP)
3. National estimates, from UNICEF and WFP.

Exceptions can be made based on the Nutrition TWG discussions regarding the data that appear to best reflect a particular country's nutritional situation. This is primarily due to different analysis coverage, periods of analysis or when a country/territory has information from several sources.

For reporting on outcome levels, which refer to the prevalence of acute malnutrition among children

**FIG. TN.6 UNICEF's conceptual framework was used as an 'entry point' for the drivers (lack of food, inadequate practices and inadequate services).**



under 5 and pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW), the following sources are considered:

1. Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) surveys
2. Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) and DHS national surveys
3. Standardised Expanded Nutrition Surveys (SENS)
4. and DHS national surveys.

## The IPC Acute Malnutrition Scale

This scale classifies the severity of acute

malnutrition in the population under assessment. The IPC analysis process reviews all contributing factors affecting acute malnutrition in the area of analysis, such as dietary intake, disease, feeding and care practices, health and WASH environment, and contextual information such as access to services and mortality (see figure TN.5).

## SMART surveys

Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) is an inter-agency initiative launched in 2002 by a network of organizations and humanitarian practitioners.

The SMART Methodology is an improved survey

method that balances simplicity (for rapid assessment of acute emergencies) and technical soundness. It draws from the core elements of several methodologies and it is based on the two most vital and basic public health indicators for the assessment of the magnitude and severity of a humanitarian crisis (*see Indicators in Appendix 4*):

- Nutritional status of children under five.
- Mortality rate of the population.

For categorizing wasting from SMART surveys the World Health Organization (WHO) cut-off values for public health significance are used.

### Malnutrition peak for 2023

Among the data endorsed for the GRFC 2024 and validated by the TWG based on the criteria outlined above, the analysis or assessment that reports the highest number of acutely malnourished children and PBW during a specific period of the year is selected as the peak. This selection does not necessarily coincide with most recent analyses available.

The peak data may originate from an analysis conducted in 2023 or from projections made in 2022 or 2023, pertaining to any period within 2023. If such data are unavailable, most recent analyses from 2021 or 2022 may serve as the peak for those years, provided the Nutrition TWG deems it still relevant.

For this edition of the GRFC, the cut-off date for data inclusion was 7 January 2024.

**FIG. TN.7 Severity index for prevalence of wasting in children aged 6–59 months**

Prevalence ranges	Label
< 2.5%	Very low
2.5–< 5%	Low
5–< 10%	Medium
10–< 15%	High
≥ 15%	Very high

Source: De Onis et al. *Public Health Nutrition*, 2018. Available at: <https://www.who.int/nutrition/team/prevalence-thresholds-wasting-overweight-stunting-children-paper.pdf>

### DISPLACEMENT DATA

#### FSIN facilitated discussions with the Displacement TWG on the available displacement data for the selected countries/territories.

Gathered data must follow the partnership criteria and requirements.

The TWG evaluated the analyses and data available for the reporting year. If no data were available for 2023, the Displacement TWG discussed the relevance and appropriateness of using data from the previous year.

Analyses covering the whole country/territory are generally preferred, but for certain countries/territories only some areas were analysed.

Data were screened for all 73 countries/territories selected but, for internal consistency, they were aggregated and reported at global and regional level for only the 59 countries/territories that had acute food insecurity data meeting the GRFC technical requirements.

Out of the 59 food-crisis countries/territories in the GRFC 2024, **35** had data for all categories of forcibly displaced persons that **met the technical requirements** to be included in the GRFC 2024.

### Data sources and methodologies

The data for refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants are provided by UNHCR

The data sources for internally displaced people adhere to the following priority ranking:

1. International Organization for Migration (IOM)
2. International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC)
3. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Exceptions to the above priority rankings can be made based on the Displacement TWG discussions and agreement on the data that appear to best reflect a particular country's displacement situation. This is primarily due to different analysis coverage, timings or when a country/territory has information from several sources. For example, UNRWA is the source for Palestine displacement data for global and regional aggregations in the report.

#### Displacement figures for 2023

The recentness of available data varies. The most recent UNHCR data for refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants are from mid-year 2023. UNHCR also provides nowcasting data that estimates displacement figures for refugees and asylum-seekers for the end of December 2023. GRFC uses UNHCR's nowcasting data for regional and global aggregations when available. UNRWA data on Palestine refugees and asylum-seekers are from September 2023.


Data used for regional and global aggregations for internally displaced persons are the most recent available and vary depending on when the analysis is conducted at the country level. When IOM data are not available and the most recently available data (2022) from IDMC's GRID are used for regional and global aggregations.

### DRIVERS OF ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

**The drivers of food crises are often interlinked and mutually reinforcing, making it difficult to pinpoint one specific trigger or main driver for each food crisis.**

The GRFC 2023 takes a practical approach by estimating which is the most salient driver for each country/territory out of:

- Conflict/insecurity
- Weather extremes
- Economic shocks.

 **Conflict/insecurity** includes interstate and intra-state conflicts, internal violence, banditry and criminality, civil unrest or political crises often leading to population displacements and/or disruption of livelihoods and food systems.

It is a key driver of acute food insecurity because in conflict situations civilians are frequently deprived of their income sources and or have difficulties in accessing food as food systems and markets are disrupted, pushing up food prices and sometimes leading to scarcities of water and fuel, or of food itself.

Landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices often destroy agricultural land, mills, storage facilities, machinery etc.

Conflict prevents businesses from operating and weakens the national economy, reducing employment opportunities, increasing poverty levels and diverting government spending towards the war effort.

Health systems are usually damaged or destroyed, leaving people reliant on humanitarian support – yet increasingly, insecurity and roadblocks prevent humanitarian convoys from reaching the most vulnerable, or aid agencies face lengthy delays, restrictions on personnel or the type or quantity of aid supplies, or insufficient security guarantees.

Parties to conflict can deny people access to food as a weapon of war, especially in areas under blockade/ embargo. Food insecurity itself can become a trigger for violence and instability, particularly in contexts marked by pervasive inequalities and fragile institutions. Sudden spikes in food prices tend to exacerbate the risk of political unrest and conflict (FAO et al., 2017).

For countries with conflict/insecurity as the primary driver during the past year, change to another primary driver needs serious consideration as recovery from conflict/insecurity takes a long time and may remain as the underlying cause of food insecurity. In cases where conflict/insecurity has reduced and/or localized, with other drivers showing a predominant effect, the change in the primary driver from the previous year is considered.



**Weather extremes** include droughts, floods, dry spells, storms, cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons and the untimely start of rainy seasons.

Weather extremes drive food insecurity by directly affecting crops and/or livestock, cutting off roads and preventing markets from being stocked. Poor harvests push up food prices and diminish agricultural employment opportunities and pastoralists' terms-of-trade, lowering purchasing power and access to food, and triggering an early lean season when households are more market-reliant because of reduced food stocks.

Adverse weather events are particularly grave for smallholder farmers and pastoralists who rely on agriculture and livestock-rearing to access food and often lack the resilience capacities to withstand and recover from the impacts of such shocks. People's vulnerability to weather shock events rests on their capacity to adapt and bounce back after their livelihood has been affected, as well as the scale and frequency of shocks. Repeated events further erode capacity to withstand future shocks.

Weather events and changes in climate can lead to an intensification of conflict, such as between

pastoralist herders and farmers over access to water and grazing. There is ample evidence suggesting that natural disasters – particularly droughts – can aggravate existing civil conflicts.



**Economic shocks** at country level can affect the food insecurity of households or individuals through various channels. Macroeconomic shocks may lead to increases in acute food insecurity through for instance, a contraction in GDP leading to high unemployment rates and consequent loss of income for those affected households, or a significant contraction in exports and/or a critical decrease in investments and other capital inflows, bringing a significant currency depreciation and high inflation, increasing production costs and food prices and worsening terms of trade which may lead to increases in acute food insecurity.

High debt and limited fiscal space constrain economic growth, increase vulnerability to economic shocks and detract from development spending.

Increases in world market prices of staple grains, oil and agricultural inputs can affect food availability, push up domestic food prices for consumers and reduce their purchasing power. Economic shocks can also occur at a more localized level or hit only a particular socioeconomic category of households. For instance, pastoralists' facing lack of animal feed, veterinary services, subsequent deteriorating livestock body conditions and depressed livestock prices are likely to be affected by a reduction in purchasing power and face a constrained access to food as a result.

**Crop pests, livestock disease and natural disasters** are also indicated as primary/secondary/tertiary drivers when relevant.

FSIN and the Food Security TWG agree the primary driver of acute food insecurity for each selected country based on what happened in the country during the year and information on

the number of people affected by each of the shocks. For countries with two or more drivers affecting different parts of the country or different population groups, the primary driver is chosen by estimating which driver affected the largest number of people and their food security at country level. While acknowledging that other drivers underlie the acute food insecurity numbers in each country in addition to the primary driver, the GRFC aggregates the number of countries by primary driver at the global level.

For countries where the analysis is purely focused on the displaced populations, the primary driver reflects the reason those populations are displaced from their country of origin.

It is also acknowledged that food insecurity is not driven solely by the occurrence of a shock, but rather by the interaction between shocks and structural vulnerabilities. Some of the main indicators of vulnerability for each country are discussed in the regional sections of chapter 2.

## Drafting

FSIN initiates the drafting process based on data endorsed by the Technical Working Groups. Some sections of the report are open to partners to contribute to the drafting directly in a shared document environment.

### Visualising the data

FSIN produces relevant infographics and maps to facilitate communication of the data.

Where infographics show numbers of acutely food-insecure people, they are disaggregated by phase where possible. In order to better contextualize the levels of acute food insecurity, the total country population and numbers of people in IPC/CH phases 1 and 2 are also shown.

### Maps

Boundaries and names shown, and designations used on the maps in this document do not imply

official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. A dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over sovereignty of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

## 3 | REVIEW AND CLEARANCE

### Review and quality control check

**FSIN shares all drafts produced with the Technical Working Groups for technical review.**

In case of controversies, discussions within the TWG take place until consensus is reached on the draft report. Otherwise it is referred to the Senior Committee to provide guidance on addressing gaps and lack of consensus as well as troubleshoot on remaining technical challenges. Comments from this first review round ensuring the technical accuracy and internal consistency of the draft report are then incorporated into the second draft of the GRFC.

The Senior Committee reviews and comments on the second draft providing recommendation on, but not limited to, the overall structure and messaging of the report. FSIN and Technical Working Groups implement Senior Committee recommendations and refine the draft.

For the GRFC 2024, there have been two iterations of review by the Senior Committee. After each review period, a discussion among partners is facilitated by FSIN to ensure consensus is reached on all aspects and information reported in the GRFC.



At the end of this process, the final draft is proof-read by FSIN.

### **Institutional clearance**

Each member of the Senior Committee facilitates the validation of the report by each partner organisation.

## **4 | RELEASE AND DISSEMINATION**

### **FSIN produces the digital and physical publication of the full GRFC report and related products.**

In coordination with the Global Network Against Food Crises, a communications campaign is developed and implemented to maximize visibility and outreach. The GRFC-related products include the English, Spanish and French versions of the GRFC In Briefs, the interactive version, and stand-alone assets including maps, country pages, spotlights, technical notes and more.

The GRFC is launched during a hybrid event with the main partners.

During the calendar year and according to the assessment calendars in different regions, FSIN, in coordination with regional partners produces and publishes regional reports to provide in-depth information on specific areas and regions. Dissemination, including outreach campaigns and events, is organized in coordination with regional partners.

## **IGAD 2024**

### **Limitations and data challenges**

There are no estimates for populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) due to the use of non-IPC/CH data sources in Ethiopia and Uganda.

### **Limited availability and frequency of IPC acute malnutrition analyses**

Five countries conducted an IPC acute malnutrition analysis covering 2023 and/or 2024: Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda.

### **Comparability of assessments**

Assessments are only considered comparable across two years if the coverage of the analysis changed by less than 10 percent, and if carried out using the same methodology and covering the same geographical areas.

All the food crises countries included in the IGAD RR 2024 have comparable data between 2023 and 2024. In Somalia, the entire country is covered in both years but the country population has increase of over 10 percent.

### **Historical inclusion of countries/territories in the GRFC, 2016–23**

Over the eight years of the GRFC's existence, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda have been systematically identified as food crises each year following the rigorous selection process: all have had data in all GRFC editions, except for Djibouti which didn't have data for 2019.

Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan have been classified as major food crises in all eight editions.

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## Chapter 3

### Djibouti

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Founded by FAO, IFPRI and WFP, the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) facilitates the exchange of technical expertise, knowledge and best practice among food security and nutrition practitioners. Its purpose is to promote timely, independent and consensus-based information about food crises, while also highlighting and addressing critical data gaps. As a key partner of the GNAFC, FSIN coordinates the publication of the *Global Report on Food Crises*.



Founded by the European Union, FAO and WFP in 2016, the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) is an alliance of humanitarian and development actors committed to addressing the root causes of food crises and finding lasting solutions to them, through shared analysis and knowledge, strengthened coordination in evidence-based responses and collective efforts across the humanitarian, development and peace (HDP) nexus.



The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a regional economic community (REC) that forms one of the building blocks of the African Union and is comprised of eight Member States, namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. IGAD seeks to assist and complement the efforts of its Member States, through increased cooperation, to achieve food security and environmental protection, peace and security, and economic cooperation and integration.